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The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that during bench 13 trials, “judges will set aside ‘extraneous matters’ and decide cases on their merits.” (holding that the distinction between jury trial and bench trial is important and that risk of unfair prejudice is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that a judge would use Spreigl evidence for improper purpose).

1610 , 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) (concluding that the due-process right to "an impartial and disinterested tribunal" extends to "adjudicative proceedings" in both civil and criminal cases); Schlienz , d at 369 (suggesting that defendant's "substantial rights" were violated by sentencing judge whose "ability to be impartial" was "call[ed] into question"); State v. Dorsey , , 252 (Minn. 2005) (discussing the due-process right to "fair trial before an impartial judge").

“Although the right to a trial before an impartial judge is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, this principle has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.”

See State v. Dorsey , d 238, 249-50 (Minn. 2005) (“An impartial trial requires that conclusions reached by the trier of fact be based upon the facts in evidence and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” (citation omitted)).

where the judge, sitting as fact -finder, independently investigated facts relevant to the defendant’s guilt, Schlienz contended that the judge lost his impartiality by suggesting to the prosecutor specific arguments to make in response to Schlienz’s motion .

“Although the right to a trial before an impartial judge is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, this principle has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.”

violation of constitutional due process and the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct.” To support her claim, appellant cites rule 2.9(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states: “A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.” “automatic reversal is required” because her due process deprivation prejudiced her and “constitutes a structural error.” As an initial matter, appella

The requirement that a judge disqualify herself if she has personal knowledge of facts in dispute is “a narrow prohibition.”

-39 (Minn. 2012) (stating that the “right of a defendant to present a complete defense is an essential principle of our criminal justice system and is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution”); (stating that “[i]n Minnesota, we have long 14 recognized that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial before an impartial judge”).

A district judge acting as a fact-finder is presumed to disregard extraneous material and “make decisions based solely on the merits.” n.8 (Minn. 2006) (“We acknowledge that evidentiary errors may be less prejudicial in a bench trial than in a jury trial.”); (affirming postconviction court’s determination that the prejudicial effec

Powers argues that the district court violated rule 2.9(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that this violation requires us to reverse and remand based on the supreme 8 court’s

“We review de novo whether a defendant’s due-process right to an impartial judge was violated.” (), review denied (Minn. Mar.

(“[J]udges are presumed to have the ability to set aside nonpersonal knowledge and make decisions based solely on the merits of cases before them.” (quotation omitted)); (“A judge’s prior adverse ruling in a case is not sufficient to show pre

-53 (Minn. 2005); (“Permitting a biased juror to serve is structural error requiring automatic reversal.”).

“Our judicial system presumes that judges are capable of setting aside collateral knowledge they possess and are able to approach every aspect of each case with 8 a neutral and objective disposition,” and this includes the ability to “disregard extraneous matters.” (quotation omitted); (stating that risk of prejudice from admission of evidence of other bad acts is reduced in a bench trial “because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons

14(3)—when the issue was not even raised in the 6 district court.3 -69 (Minn. 2009); -49 (Minn. 2005).

(“[J]udges are presumed to have the ability to set aside nonpersonal knowledge and make decisions based solely on the merits of cases before them.” (quotation omitted)); (“A judge’s prior adverse ruling in a case is not sufficient to show pre