Cited by

See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993) (constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1984) (denial of a public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self-representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (denial of counsel); -53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a 7 biased judge as fact-finder); -25 (Minn. 1995) (denial of right to an impartial jury).

ied on [its] own ‘nonpersonal knowledge’ of whether gun ranges were closed on that date” or “investigated that issue independent of evidence introduced at trial to make this factual determination that benefited the state.” He then argues that the inferred conduct transformed the court into a trier of fact who was no longer impartial, thereby creating a that requires a new trial.

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); (stating that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial before an impartial judge).

253 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. Code Jud.

32 “Our judicial system presumes that judges are capable of setting aside collateral knowledge they possess and are able to ‘approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective disposition.’” (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 561-62 (1994)); d 526, 533 (Minn. 2006) (“There is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly.”).

State v. Dorsey , (M inn.

“Structural errors are errors that affect the entire conduct of the [proceeding] from beginning to end.” Greer v. United States 4, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2021) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)

d 238, 249 (Minn. 2005).

d 238, 253 (Minn. 2005).

7 The Assistant Chief Judge’s memorandum noted that she found no evidence that the judge possessed “personal knowledge” about Malone, such that he was disqualified under Minn. R. Jud.

“A judge’s conduct mu st be fair to both sides.” State v. Dorsey , 50 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

She notes that our supreme court has cautioned that “‘[j]udges should avoi d the appearance of impropriety and should act to assure that par ties have no reason to think their case is not being fairly judged.’” State v. Dorsey , (-65 (Minn. 2002)).

To be impar tial, the fact -finder must base its conclusions on “the facts in evidence” and must not reach conclusions “based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” State v. Dorsey , -50 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. Code Jud.

e, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993) (constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2217 (1984) (denial of public-trial right); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self - representation at trial); -53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a biased judge as fact -finder); State v. Logan , -25 (Minn. 1995) (denial of right to impa

In State v. Dorsey, the Minnesota Supreme Court established a bright-line rule that “judges may not engage in independent investigations of facts in evidence.”

And “[o]ur judicial system presumes that judges are capable of setting aside collateral knowledge they possess and are able to ‘approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective disposition.’” (quoting Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 5 61-62, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1160 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

an v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993) (constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (noting cases holding that total deprivation of t he right to counsel at trial and non-impartial judges as structural errors ); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 –78 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self -representation at trial); –53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a biased judge as fact finder); State v. Reiners , (erroneous denial of a defendant’s perempto

“[S]tructural errors are defects in the co nstitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards.” (quotations omitted).

is a question of law, which we review de novo.” (citation omitted).

To be impartial, the fact -finder must base its conclusions on “the facts in evidence, ” and must not “reach[] conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” d 238, 249 -50 (Minn. 2005) .

“An impartial trial requires that conclusions reached by the tr ier of fact be based upon the facts in evidence and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” d 238, 249-50 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted).

“Whether a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

see also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2057 (1987) (“We have recognized that some constitutional rights [including the right to an impartial adjudicator] are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” (quotation omitted)).

Andersen, d at 915 ; –49 (Minn. 2005) (stating that “it is presumed that judges will set aside collateral knowledge and approach cases with a neutral and objective disposition .

State v. Dorsey , , 246 (Minn. 2005).

“[E]rrors violating constitutional rights can be divided into two categories: ‘trial errors’ and ‘structural defects.’” State v. Dorsey , 2 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that during bench 13 trials, “judges will set aside ‘extraneous matters’ and decide cases on their merits.” (holding that the distinction between jury trial and bench trial is important and that risk of unfair prejudice is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that a judge would use Spreigl evidence for improper purpose).