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To be disqualifying, such bias or prejudice “must stem from an extrajudicial source,” resulting in an opinion “on some basis other than what the judge learned from [their] participation in the case.” d 569, 573 (Minn. App. 1986).

To be disqualifying, such bias or prejudice “must stem from an extrajudicial source,” resulting in an opinion “on some basis other than what the judge learned from [their] participation in the case.” d 569, 573 (Minn. App. 1986).

Moreover, to be disqualifying, bias or prejudice “must stem from an extrajudicial source,” resulting in an opinion “on some basis other than what the judge learned from [their] participation in the case.”

To be disqualifying, such bias or prejudice “must stem from an extrajudicial source,” resulting in an opinion “on some basis other than what the judge learned from [their] participation in the case.” d 569, 573 (Minn. App. 1986).

To be disqualifying, a judge’s bi as or prejudice “must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” In re Estate of Lange

But “[b]ias or prejudice, to be disqualifying, must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31-35, 41 S. Ct. 230, 232-33 (1921)).

Disqualifying bias “must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.”

“Bias or prejudice, to be disqualifying, must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his 16 participation in the case.”

To require reversal, judicial bias must originate from an extrajudicial source, or be pervasive, which is conduct that is “so extreme as to display [a] clear inability to render fair judgment.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1155 (1994).

meet her needs.” Dr. Furhman’s report also stated that Tor-gersen “should not act unilaterally in matters of complexity or consequence.” We have previously noted that “[l]ess mental capacity is required to make a will than to conduct regular business *554 affairs.” -45 (Minn.App.1984) (citing Co ngdon, d at 267 ); (stating that a decedent’s “inability to negotiate a farm rental contract is not determinative of her testamentary capacity”).

In order for bias or prejudice to be disqualifying it “must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.”