Cited by

(holding that the prevailing party in consumer-fraud action could not be awarded attorney fees under section 3 Hogendorf argues that an interpretation limiting the recovery of attorney fees after agency involvement “would effectively eviscerate MERLA’s fee provision, as state agencies frequently bec

(“[W]e hold that the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.”).

The MCFA “reflect[s] a clear legislative policy encouraging aggressive prosecution of statutory violations” and thus should be generally very broadly construed to 14 enhance consumer protection.” (quotation omitted).

(holding that plaintiffs who bring claims under the private attorney general statute must also “demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public”).

The MCFA contains no private enforcement mechanism, and “the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.” see also Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd.

That statute “applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.”

3a; (holding that the private attorney general provision “applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public”).

11 Alternatively, we have said that “abrogation must be by express wording or necessary implication.” See

But section 8.31 applies “only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.” Ly v. Nystrom, 4 (declin ing to apply the statute to a one-on-one transaction involving fraudulent misrepresentation).

4, 2004); Ly 16 v. Nystrom, (“We have .

We “do not presume that the Legislature intends to abrogate or modify a common law rule except to the extent expressly declared or clearly indicated in the statute.” Id.; see also Ly v. Nystrom , (“We have .

Ly v. Nystrom , see also Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River , (“Unless st atutory provisions instruct otherwise, the conclusion we reach under the common law will stand.”) “[I]f a statute abrogates the common law, the abrogation must be by ex press wording or necessary im

We do not presume “that the legislature intended to abrogate or modify a rule of the common law on the subject any further than that which is expressly declared or clearly indicated.” Rosenberg, d at 328 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); (“We have .

(“[T]he Private AG Statute a pplies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action bene fits the public.”).

Ly v. Nystrom , , 314 (Minn. 2000).

Subdivision 3a “grants private citizens the right to act as a ‘private’ att orney general.”

This reasoning was anchored in a case that held “that the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.”

The supreme court has held that “the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate tha t their cause of action benefits the public.” d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000).

” Ly v. Nystrom , d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000).

The objective of statutory interpretation is to “effectuate the intent of the legislature.”

d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000) (“[T]he Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.”).

The act “applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.” d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000).

-14 (Minn.2000) (concluding that the Private AG statute applies to causes of action that benefit the public).