Cited by

at 726 (citing State v. Reiners , -34 (Minn. 2003)); n.11 (Minn. 2016); (citing Onyelobi for this principle).

At step three of the Batson analysis, the district court’s role “is to do more than determine whether the prosecutor articulated some basis for the challenge,” McRae, d at 258, and it is “important” for the district court “to state fully its factual findings, including any credibility determinations,”

(impartial judge and finder of fact); -68 (Minn. 2004) (judge communicating with jury outside defendant’s presence); (denial of the defendant’s peremptory challenge); (improper closure of the courtroom violating right to public trial); (denial of defendant’s request for self-representation during a criminal tria

Other “indicia of pretext” includ e the striking party’s 11 deviation from “its normal pattern of questioning” and the reliance on answers to questions that “would have elicited the same response from any fair -minded person.”

“[T]he existence of racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a factual determination that is to be made by the district court and should be given great deference on review.”

It is important for the district court to clearly demarcate and “announce on the record its analysis of each of the three steps of the Batson analysis.”

at 356; (“Where, as here, the trial court proceeded to the second step in the process, the issue whether the defendant established a prima facie case of the discriminatory use of a peremptory strike is moot.” ); (declining to address whether a prima facie showing had been made when the district court essentially began its Batson analysis at step two and neither party petitioned for review of that ruling ); State v. Scott, 8 (“Because the trial court ruled on the ultimate

ruction); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (noting cases holding that total deprivation of t he right to counsel at trial and non-impartial judges as structural errors ); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 –78 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self -representation at trial); –53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a biased judge as fact finder); State v. Reiners , (erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge); –25 (Minn. 1995) (prejudice resulting from failure to dismiss a potential juror for c

Pendleton , d at 723 ; see also State v. Reiners , , 831 (Minn. 2003).

and should be given great deference on review.”

State v. Reiners , see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 , 114 S. Ct. at 1421 .

See State v. Reiners , (“The importance of clarity at each step of the analysis is that the opponent has the burden of proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race -neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.”).

State v. Reiners , , 832 (Minn. 2003).

We begin our analysis by noting that our review of appellant’s argument is guided by the principle that “the existence of racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a factual determination that is to be made by the district court and should be given great deference on review.”

“Peremptory challenges allow a party to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some others and, by this process, to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.”

pplies a three-part test : (1) “the opponent of a peremptory challenge [must make] out a prima facie case of racial discrimination”; (2) “the proponent of the strike [must] come forward with a race-neutral explanation” for the peremptory challenge; and (3) the district court must then decide “whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770- 71 (1995)); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106

without prejudice,” peremptory challenges may be based on “sudden impressions, gestures, or a mere feeling”; indeed, “[a] prosecutor may exercise a peremptory challenge for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried.” (internal quotation marks omitted); (“Peremptory challenges allow a party to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some others and, by this process, to select as final jurors th

d 826, 832 (Minn. 2003).

But “the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a member of a racial minority does not necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”

The supreme court has emphasized “[t]he importance of clarity at each step of the analysis” because “the opponent has the burden of proving a pri-ma facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.”

Regarding the State’s first proffered reason for the peremptory strike, we have “consistently held that a family member’s involvement with the legal system is a legitimate race-neutral reason for the State to exercise a peremptory challenge.” Martin, d at 104 (citations omitted); (involvement of a prospective juror or a close family member in law enforcement is a race-neutral reason for challenge); Greenleaf, d at 501 (prospective juror’s “sympathy for a brother in prison” was a race-neutral rea

“Peremptory challenges allow a party to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some others and, by this process, to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.”