Cited by

And this court has recognized that Minnesota’s HRO and OFP statute s “are sufficiently similar so that we may recognize caselaw construing the former as applicable to the latter.”

d 909, 911 n.1 (Minn. App. 1995); see also Ness, d at 227 (noting that OFPs and HROs are both civil orders and contrasting them with DANCOs); Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2022) (authorizing HROs).

(holding that evidentiary hearing was required under an arbitration statute); Anderson v. Lake , (discussing type of hearing required under the harassment restraining order statute).

(stating that caselaw concerning the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act 10 may apply in interpreting the HRO statute).

In ruling on a petition for an HRO, a district court “must base its findings upon testimony and any documents properly introduced into evidence.” Anderson v. Lake , -12 (Minn. App. 1995); accord.

However, she cites to Anderson v. Lake, in which this court observed that the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act and the statute governing the issuance of HROs are “sufficiently similar so that we may recognize caselaw construing the former as applicable to the latter.”

Anderson v. Lake , d 909, 911-12 (Minn. App. 1995).

See id.; (stating that caselaw under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act may be recognized in interpreting the HRO statute).

Ourada argues that the district court erred by denying him his right to cross -examine Bresson during the hearing.

-99 (Minn. 2018) (stating that order-for-protection relief under the Domestic Abuse Act may not be obtained unless a petitioner first meets the statutory requirements to show that domestic abuse has occurred); 6 (reasoning that the Domestic Abuse Act and the harassment statute are similar and “we may recognize caselaw construing the former as applic able to the latter”).

5(a), and that “[t]he hearing requirement includes the ‘right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to produce documents,’”

While we have previously stated that the Domestic Abuse Act and the harassment statute “are sufficiently similar so that we may recognize caselaw construing the former as applicable to the latter,” the plain language of the harassment statute, unlike the statute at issue in Kass, includes no 6 requirement of a showing of either present harm or a present intent to do harm.

(noting that the hearing requirements for an HRO include the right to examine and cross- examine witnesses and to produce documents).

for this argument, but the “full hearing” language those cases construed has been deleted from Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd.

& n.1 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that “[the Domestic Abuse Act] and [the harassment statute] are sufficiently similar so that we may recognize caselaw construing the former as applicable to the latter” and finding “the parallels between .

(purpose of all examination, direct and cross, is “to elicit facts to show the truth”).