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if there was racial discrimination in the selection of th [e] jury.” -01 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

404(b) (“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”); d 488, 504-05 (Minn. 1999) (concluding that exclusion, at murder trial, of “reverse Spreigl” evidence of accomplice’s conviction for sexual assault was not an abuse of discretion, where the only similarity between murder and assault was the accomplice’s propensity to commit crimes).

Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

1682 ; State v. Greenleaf , , 497 (Minn. 1999) (holding that questions that are unlikely to elicit incriminating responses do not require Miranda warnings).

to support his argument that ex parte statements made during police questioning are traditionally considered untrustworthy.

intoxication is ordinarily inadmissible because most jurors have some experience with [this] condition[].” (concluding that expert testimony “in regard to t he general effects of alcohol” would not have aided the jury).

Finally, if the party who exercised the peremptory challenge articulates a race-neutral reason for the strike, then “the ultimate burden,” see id., rests with the opponent to persuade the district court that the proffered reason was merely a pretext for the party’s true motive: “purposeful discrimination,”

Id.; State v. Greenleaf , (“The identical nature of the charged offenses and the nearly identical evidence against each defendant supports the trial court ’s decision to join [ the defendants] for trial.”).

Though Minnesota courts have never determined whether asking for consent to a DNA sample constitutes interrogation, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that asking a suspect if he wants to waive extradition does not constitute interrogation “because it is highly unlikely that asking someone whether they want to waive extradition would elicit an incriminating response.”

v. 15 Greenleaf, (concluding a prima facie case had not been made despite the peremptory removal of several women, as “the first two jurors selected were women, and a total of six women, including alternates, were seated on the jury”).

“A grand jury determines whether ‘there is probable cause to believe the accused has committed a particular crime.’ ” ().'

“In Batson, the Supreme Court established a three-step [test] to determine whether a peremptory challenge is motivated by a prohibited discriminatory intent.” (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 9 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986)).

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the Supreme Court established a three- part test “to determine whether a peremptory challenge is motivated by a prohibited discriminatory intent.”

(upholding a peremptory strike of a juror based on the juror’s sympathy toward the defendant).

(noting that routine booking statements do not require Miranda warnings); (stating that biographical questions do not require Miranda warnings); (explaining that routine booking questions relating to name

504 (Minn.1999) (upholding first-degree murder conviction); -400 (Minn.1985) (upholding rape conviction); 408-09 (Minn.1984) (upholding first-degree murder conviction).

(citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 , 106 S.Ct.

A grand jury determines whether “there is probable cause to believe the accused has committed a particular crime.”