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It is prejudicial for the state to be “denied the opportunity to investigate an alibi.” (observing that “[o]ne of the purposes of the disclosure of alibi rule is to avoid” surprise alibi testimony at trial).

Notably, the supreme court has held that a district court D-8 abuses its discretion by failing to consider the Lindsey factors because it prevents appellate courts from being “confident that the sanction was not disproportionate to the purpose it was meant to serve.”

-19 (Minn. 2001) (reversing where there was “no evidence in the record that the trial court considered a continuance or that the state requested one”).

We recognize that we have reached a different conclusion in a previous decision related to a different Rule 9 affirmative defense, –19 (Minn. 2001).

(“[A] defense attorney has an obligation to understand the basi c rules of discovery.”).

Erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require reversal if the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

419 (Minn. 2001) (finding reversible error when the district court precluded defendant’s testimony as a sanction for failing to provide notice of its alibi defense because the district court did not consider the feasibility that a continuance could rectify the prejudice.)

see also In re Welfare of M.P.Y., 5 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to testify in his own defense.”).

was apparent 9 from the context within which the questions were asked”); (concluding that offer of proof was not necessary when substance of precluded testimony was apparent).

Although the better practice is to place the defendant’s waiver of the right to testify on the record, -08 & 408 n.1 (Minn. 2005), Minnesota does not require that a defendant’s waiver of the right to testify be made on the record

See generally (noting defendant’s due process right to testify in his own defense) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 , 107 S.Ct.