Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19.

44 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
We are not persuaded otherwise by Schouviller’s rev’d d 312 (Minn. 2005).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
But if “the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
But the supreme court has held that if “the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
In State v. Smith , the supreme court concluded that “where the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the preparation of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.” Here, depriving the childr
Mary Kate Nguyen, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Shawn Richard Burrington, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
And if the confinement is “completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.” rev’d
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
He acknowledges t hat he used force against A.M.B., but argues that it was incidental to his “goal of engag ing in sex.” Appellant’s argument is rooted in State v. Smith, which held that “where the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not 6 constitute kidnapping.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The supreme court relied on its earlier decision in State v. Smith, which held, in the context of kidnapping, that “confinement or removal must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime in order to justify a separate criminal sentence.” overruled on other grounds by State v. Leake
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
In making this argument, he relies on two kidnapping cases, overruled on other grounds by State v. Leake
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
5 In both of these cases, the kidnapping charges were overturned and the court held that “where the confinement or removal of the victim is com pletely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.” State v. Smith , -21 (Minn. 2004).
State of Minnesota v. Bryan Blocker Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Bryan Blocker Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. George Cornelius Watkins Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. George Cornelius Watkins Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(holding, in relevant part, that “where the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping”)
State of Minnesota v. Hugh Alexander Larson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Hugh Alexander Larson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
d 312, 323 (Minn. 2005).
Michael Cordale Henderson v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Michael Cordale Henderson v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
The Kidnapping Conviction In a kidnapping case, the confinement or removal “must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime, in order to justify a separate criminal sentence.” overruled on other grounds
State of Minnesota v. Dontrell Dyna Flowers Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Dontrell Dyna Flowers Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(citing Ihnot, d at 587) (stating that the fourth and fifth factors of the Jones analysis are satisfied if the defendant’s credibility is a central issue in the case), d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (stating that
State v. Juarez 837 N.W.2d 473 Minn. 2013
State v. Juarez 837 N.W.2d 473 Minn. 2013
to support his argument that the present offense did not involve a heinous element.
State v. Daniels 765 N.W.2d 645 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Daniels 765 N.W.2d 645 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Crow 730 N.W.2d 272 Minn. 2007
State v. Crow 730 N.W.2d 272 Minn. 2007
See, -23 (Minn.2006); -21 (Minn.2004); -33 (2003).
State v. Osborne 715 N.W.2d 436 Minn. 2006
State v. Osborne 715 N.W.2d 436 Minn. 2006
.W.2d at 271 , "[pjrior to Blakely , 'statutory maximum’ was generally thought to mean the heaviest penalty a court could impose on a defendant — the ceiling of the relevant statutory sentencing range.” See also, (construing the term "statutory maximum” from Apprendi to be the maximum sentence authorized by the legislature); (holding that Apprendi was not implicated where only the minimum term of imprisonment was affected by a finding by the court without a jury, so long as the sentence was with
Turnage v. State 708 N.W.2d 535 Minn. 2006
Turnage v. State 708 N.W.2d 535 Minn. 2006
We have held that “where the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.”
State v. Swanson 707 N.W.2d 645 Minn. 2006
State v. Swanson 707 N.W.2d 645 Minn. 2006
State v. Earl 702 N.W.2d 711 Minn. 2005
State v. Earl 702 N.W.2d 711 Minn. 2005
State v. Leake 699 N.W.2d 312 Minn. 2005
State v. Leake 699 N.W.2d 312 Minn. 2005
State v. Barker 692 N.W.2d 755 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
State v. Barker 692 N.W.2d 755 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
that Apprendi did not apply to the mandatory-minimum provision in the heinous-offense statute.
State v. Leja 684 N.W.2d 442 Minn. 2004
State v. Leja 684 N.W.2d 442 Minn. 2004
State v. Ali 679 N.W.2d 359 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State v. Ali 679 N.W.2d 359 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State v. Welch 675 N.W.2d 615 Minn. 2004
State v. Welch 675 N.W.2d 615 Minn. 2004
But, while Welch’s appeal was pending, which held as follows: We believe that confinement or removal must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime, in order to justify a separate criminal sentence.