Cited by

(stating that mental illness or mental or emotional disability that precludes a parent from providing proper parental care can render a county’s reasonable efforts futile).

( concluding that the failure of the social worker to read the case plan word for word to the parent di d not preclude a determination that the county made reasonable efforts where the terms of the plan were known to that parent )

.” Because mo ther does not explain, and we cannot discern, how her bonding contention relates to the district court’s conclusion that, under the applicable law, the county proved the existence of certain statutory grounds for termination, we construe her bonding contention as a challenge that is limited to the district court’s best-interests determination.1 80 (Minn. 1986) (stating that when conducting a best-interest analysis, “judicial caution in severing the family bonds is imperative”).

III , (concluding absence of written plan did not warrant reversal when parent’s lack of cooperation prevented construction of plan); (“That one social worker did not read the plan to the mother, word for word, is not a basis for reversal of the termination order.”); In re Welfare of J.J.L.B.

See, -38 (Minn. 2014); State ex rel.

“Under our law, children are not to be kept waiting, uncertain who will raise them or where they will grow up.” (observing “the importance of emotional and psy chological stability to a child’ s sense of security, happiness and adaptation, as well as the degree of unanimity among child psychologists regarding the fundamental significance of permanency to a child’s development”).

The supreme court has “observed the importance of emotional and psychological stability to a child’s sense of security, happiness, and adaptation, as well as the degree of unanimity among child psychologists regarding the fundamental significance of permanency to a child’s development.”

See, (noting that dela ys affect “a child’s o pportunity to have a 12 permanent home”); (characterizing “untoward delay” in resolu tion of certain child-c ustody matters as “intolerable”); Majestic Inc. v. Berry , (“In the interest of finality, ‘setting aside a judgment on voidness grounds is narrowly restricted.’”), review denied (Minn. Aug.

While “judicial caution in severing the family bonds is imperative,” the Minnesota Supreme Court has observed that “[juvenile protection] proceedings are expedited because a quick resolution is essential for the best interests of children,” d 127, 134 (Minn. 2014).

(“[Juvenile protection] proceedings are expedited because a quick resolution is essential for the best interests of children who are in need of protection .

In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

(recognizing the importance of stability in a child’s life when deciding whether to terminate parental rights); d 616, 622 (Minn. App. 1996) (affirming termination when mother failed to comply with 6 her parental d

See 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 514, § 8 (codification of paramount nature of child’s best interests in termination proceedings); In re Welfare of (noting that the best-interests doctrine “has long been recognized as the common thread in cases determining ...

2(a) (2008); see, e.g., In re Welfare of (finding no basis to distinguish among the various child-placement procedures, whether temporary or permanent, and concluding that the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration).

at 311; (stating, in context of a termination-of-parental-rights case, that in a conflict between the child's interests and the parent's interests, "parental rights must yield to the best interest of the child”).

Whether efforts to reunite the family are reasonable “requires consideration of the length of time the county has been involved with the family as well as the quality of effort given.” (citing In re Welfare of ).

(“[T]he paramount nature of a child’s best interests is a principle that has been part of Minnesota child welfare law for at least 100 years.”) ( (noting that best interests doctrine “has long been recognized as the common thread in.cases determining * * * the circumstances in which children are required to live” and adopting best interests doctrine “as a paramount consideration” in termination of parental rights cases)), and State ex rel.

(recognizing the best interests of the child in termination proceedings).

d at 76, n. 4 .; (holding that the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration in terminating parental rights); Act of April 14, 1988, ch. 514, § 8, 1988 Minn. Laws 402 , 407.

4 (1996); In re Welfare of

Whether efforts are “reasonable” also “requires consideration of the length of time the county has been involved with the family as well as the quality of effort given.” (citing In re Welfare of ).

In many instances, foster care became “a system of long-term care characterized by considerable instability for the children.” In re Welfare of

4 (1994); AD., d at 648 ().

-48 (Minn.1995); (citing In re Welfare of ); -21 (Minn.App.1987) (stating standard for reviewing decisions to terminate parental rights).

Despite this presumption, “the best interest[s] of the child standard [is a] paramount consideration in termination of parental rights proceedings.”

See In re Welfare of (best-interests-of-the-child standard is the paramount consideration in termination of parental rights proceedings).