Cited by

Under Terry, police may stop and search a suspect, even in the absence of probable cause, when “(1) they have reasonable, artic ulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson

A police officer who possesses the requisite suspicion “may conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person[] in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

aff'd, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

Whether a promise must be enforced to prevent an injustice is “a legal question for the court, as it involves a policy decision.”

See State 3 v. Dickerson, aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

A police officer may pat-search an individual if the officer has a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that [the individual] might be engaged in criminal activity” and “reasonably believes [that the individual] might be armed and dangerous.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884).

(“[M]erely being in a high-crime area will not justify a stop.”).

Under Terry, police officers “may stop and frisk a person when (1) there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 9 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

“The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder.” (quotation omitted).

aff’d, 6 Minnesota appellate courts have historically addressed the criminal code’s imprecise mens rea requirements and whether and how mens rea attaches to various elements of particular crimes.

“Warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507-514 (1967)).

Under Terry, a police officer “may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

(quotation omitted), aff’d, Minn. v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

18, 2000); d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (stating that evasive conduct is relevant to determining whether weapons search is justified); State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 437, (stating that a suspect’s hostile or threatening attitude is relevant to determining whether weapons search is justified).

But we defer to the district court on matters of credibility, aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), and the district court found that neither witness was credible.

(concluding “suspicious movements” in vehicle gave officers reasonable suspicion defendant might have been armed and dangerous); (stating that evasive conduct may give rise to reasonable suspicion).

But “[t]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder.” (quotation omitted), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25, 120 S. Ct. at 676; aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); Johnson, d at 827.

aff’d, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

Under Terry, police may “stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113, S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676) (“[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”); (“[D]efendant’s evasive conduct after eye contact with police, combined with his departure from a building with a history of drug activity, justified police in reasonably suspecting criminal activity.”).

“[M]erely being in a high-crime area will not justify a stop.” aff’d, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

(quotation omitted), aff’d Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

Police officers may “stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” (d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993)).

Although this alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a police officer also testified that he observed Hunter’s SUV enter the parking lot and park in a 2 Through counsel, Hunter implicitly challenges the officer’s testimony that he observed a bag of cocaine by calling it “implausible.” In a pro se supplemental brief, Hunter argues that the heavy ti

(upholding an investigatory stop based on defendant’s evasive conduct and immediate departure from a building that was known to contain drug activity).

(“[O]ne circumstance giving rise to reasonable suspicion is evasive conduct.”), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

“[T]he promise must be clear and definite.”

(trial strategy); (witness credibility), aff'd 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct.

791 n. 7 (Minn.1999); Watson, d at 688 ; Wallow Winona, , 390 remanded on reh’g, Harms v. Independent Sch.

aff'd, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct.