Cited by

(recognizing that “credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder” and district court’s credibility determinations are “accord[ed] great deference”) (quotation omitted)).

-43 (Minn. 1992), aff’d sub nom.

See State v. Dickerson , (recognizing that “credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder” and district court’s credibility determinations are “accord[ed] great deference” (quo tation omitted)).

The district court is in the best position to make findings on credibility, and nothing in th e record shows that the district court abused its discretion when it found Olson’s testimony at the plea-withdrawal hearing not credible.

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

The question is “whether enforcement is required to prevent an injustice.”

“Terry holds that police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous .” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 11 (1993).

When an officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct “a carefully limited frisk for weapons.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

See United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 1983) (considering officers’ knowledge of defendants’ brother’s murder and likelihood of retaliation as motive for earlier crime under totality of circumstances); (noting that presence in high -crime area is independently insufficient to justify a stop but that “departure from a building with a history of drug activity” factored into totality of circumstances).

aff’d , 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

When officers lack probable 3 A Terry search is “a carefully limited frisk for weapons.” d 840, 846 (Minn. 1992) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884).

Under Terry, police may “stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S. Ct. at 1884 ), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

(recognizing that “credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder” and district court’s credibility determinations are “accord[ed] great deference” (quotation omitted)).

-43 (Minn. 1992), aff’d sub nom.

Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S. Ct. 308, 311 (1984); , aff’d by Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S .

6 When reviewing a suppression order, we examine the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, State v. Dickerson

State v. Dickerson, 5 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)).

d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (“[T]he trier of fact is in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence.”); State v. Dickerson , (“[Appellate courts] accord great deference to the [district] court’s determinations [because] .

See State v. Dickerson , (recognizing that the “credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder” and district court’s credibility determinations are “accord[ed] great deference” (citation and quotation omitted)).

The Terry exception stems from the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Terry v. Ohio, which permits police to “stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect mi ght be armed and dangerous.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

The Terry exception permits police to “stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspec t might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1 993).

However, police “may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)).

xception, the police may, without a warrant, seize an object they believe to be evidence of a crime, provided: “(1) [the] police are legitimately in the position from which they view the object; (2) they have a lawful right of access to the object; and (3) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent.” (-45 (Minn. 1992).

Under Terry, “police may stop and frisk a per son when (1) they have a reas onable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

(holding that great deferenc e is given to the trial court’s determinations of witness credibility, and th e appropriate weight to be 13 given to witness testimony rests within the province of the factfinder), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); Johnson, d at 387 (“[T]he inconsistencies and re

” State v. Dickerson , aff’d, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

“The credibility of witnesses and the wei ght to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder.” State v. Dickerson , (quotation omitte d).

aff’d, Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

4 D E C I S I O N When reviewing a district court’ s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard, , and defer to the district court’s credibility determinations

See, e.g., *57 State v. Dickerson , , 843 (Minn. 1992), aff'd , 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct.

We generally defer to a di strict court’s credibility determinations, which the record supports here.

Although an individual’s presence in a high-crime area does not by itself justify a stop, “officers are not required to ignore the relevant ch aracteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are su fficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).

aff’d 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (upholding legality of stop when officers observed the defendant depart from a building that had a history of drug activity , and defendant avoided eye contact with police); see also M.D.R., d at 449 (upholding legality of stop when officers

8 (during valid Terry stop, permitting frisk of a defendant if police reasonably suspect that the defendant could be armed and dangerous), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

State v. Dickerson , aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

(stating that district court findings are not reversed unless clearly erroneous, and great deference is given to court’s determinations regarding credibility of witnesses), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); see also State v. Klamar , (stating that

“[P]olice may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” (citation omitted).

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676; State v. Dickerson

State v. Dickerson , aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

Under Terry, “police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” ( Dickerson I) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

See State v. Dickerson , (stating that “defendant’s evasive conduct after eye contact 7 with police .

(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)).