Cited by

Injustice The third element of a promissory estoppel claim—whether a promise must be enforced to prevent an injustice—“is a legal question for the court, as it involves a policy decision.”

(stating that evasive conduct may amount to reasonable suspicion).

at 37-38 ( aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)).

(stating that “merely being in a high-crime area will not justify a stop”), aff’d, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); Fort, d at 419 (explaining that mere presence in a “high drug” area does not constitute reasonable suspicion); WL 3161880

Officers may conduct a pat-frisk of “a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” Flowers, d at 250 ().

See Turner, d at 628–29; –91 (Minn. 1992).

P olice “may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

“[M]erely being in a high-crime area will not justify a stop,” let alone provide probable cause to believe a vehicle in the area contains contraband.

aff’d, 508 U.S. 336 (1993).

see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 (1979).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

(“The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder.” (quotation omitted)).

(determining that “suspicious movements” lasting approximately 45 seconds justified a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle’s occupant was “involved in some type of criminal activity and that he might have been armed and dangerous”); (noting that presence in a high-crime area combined with evasive conduct can justify a suspicion of criminal activity).

We conclude that this information is likewise insufficient to support reasonable, articulable suspicion because “merely being in a high-crime area will not justify a stop.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (reasoning that appellate courts defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations).

(concluding that the defendant’s evasive conduct after noticing police, combined with his departure from a location known for drug activity, provided reasonable suspicion for police to stop the defendant).

We decline to disturb the postconviction court’s credibility determination because “[t]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder.” (quotation omitted); 9 (“[C]redibility determinations are the exclusive province of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of clear error.” (citing DeMar

(considering defendant’s evasive conduct).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Dickerson , (quotation omitted).

“One such exception is the protective pat search for weapons.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

4 While mere presence in a high-crime area is insufficient to justify a stop, courts may consider a person’s presence in a high- crime area to contextualize other evidence , d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (contextualizing suspect’s behavior by considering his departure from a building with a history of drug activity) (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

“ One such exception is the protective pat search for weapons.” .

(“The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder.” (quotation omitted)).

2 We note that while mere presence in a high-crime area is insufficient to justify a stop , courts may consider a person’s presence in a high-crime area to contextualize other evidence , (contextualizing suspect’s behavior by considering his departure from a building with a history of drug activity).

(explaining that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are determinations to be made by the factfinder).

B. Constitutionality of the Pat -Down Search When a limited investigatory detention is permitted under Terry, “police may conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of [the detained] person in an attempt to discover weapons.” State v. Dickerson , (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30) , aff’d 508 U.S. 366 (1993) .

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

aff’d, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).

(taking into consideration the totality of several weaker justifications of suspicion to determine if the circumstances “sufficiently supplement one another to make the sum any greater than the parts”); aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (concluding (1) police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a stop when defendant’s conduct was evasive after making eye contact with the police and he had just exited a building that police knew had a history of drug activity, and (2) concluding a f

The Association acknowledges that the district court did not use the term “injustice”

(reviewing questions of fact regarding validity of a plea for clear error); (noting that appellate courts do not make credibility determinations), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

“ Terry holds that police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993).

(r ecognizing that witness credibility and the weight of witness testimony are matters for the factfinder, and such determinations are given “great deference” on appeal).

8 be armed and dangerous.” aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).