Cited by

He cites State v. DeShay for the basic proposition that “experts with specialized knowledge” have the potential to “unduly influence the jury.”

8 (“Even if acceptable under rule 702, expert testimony should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”); -02 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that a rule 701 analysis focuses on “whether the witness personal

“Even if acceptable under Rule 702, expert testimony should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” d 878, 888 (Minn. 2003) (citing Minn. R. Evid.

An error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it “substantially influence[d] the [fact-finder]’s decision.”

The primary inquiry is whether “the expert’s testimony will help the trier of fact in evaluating evidence 5 or resolving factual iss ues.”

(considering prejudice only after determining that expert testimony was inadmissible).

In addition, our supreme court has cautioned that “expert testimony [should] be carefully monitored in criminal cases so that a jury is not dissuaded from exercising its own independent judgment.” State v. DeShay

concern that expert testimony be carefully monitored in criminal cases so that a jury is not dissuaded from exercising its own independent judgment.” d 878, 885 (Minn. 2003).

Thomas contends that the testimony was excessive and unnecessary because this case “did not involve a sophisticated prostitution ring.” He relies on State v. DeShay, where the supreme court observed that “[g]ang expert testimony in this noncomplex drug conspiracy, to the extent relevant, was largely duplicative, giving little assistance to the jury in evaluating the evidence.”

We will reverse “only when the error substantially influences the jury’s decision.” State v. DeShay , ().

State v. Taylor , , 14 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. DeShay , , 888 (Minn. 2003) ).

An error is sufficiently prejudicial to justify a new trial “when the error substantia lly influences the jury’s decision.”

See, (concluding that gang-expert testimony in a noncomplex drug case was duplicative of other ev idence and did not assist the jury in evaluating the evidence).

14 The need to prove that a defendant was involved in a criminal gang “does not open the door to unlimited expert testimony.” State v. DeShay

State v. DeShay , , 886 (Minn. 2003).

See, –91 (Minn. App. 2002) (“The conspiracy statute does not require that the state prove DeShay personally sold ten or more grams of cocaine within a 90–day period; only that he participated in an agreement to sell ten or more grams of cocaine within a 90–day period.”), aff’d

“The ultimate question of admissibility for expert 5 testimony is whether the expert’s testimony will help the trier of fact in evaluating evidence or resolving factual issues.” (quotation omitted).

The State may offer expert testimony on gangs when, as here, a defendant has been charged with committing a crime for the benefit of a gang, id., and the testimony adds “precision or depth to the jury’s ability to reach conclusions about matters that are not within its experience,”

Even if the district court erred in excluding this evidence, any error was harmless because it did not “substantially influence[] the jury’s decision.” (quotation omitted).

In State v. Deshay, we noted that “[t]he conspiracy statute does not require that the state prove DeShay personally sold ten or more grams of cocaine within a 90-day period; only that he participated in an agreement to sell ten or more grams of cocaine within a 90-day period.” -91 (Minn. App. 2002), aff’d

To be admissible, “gang expert testimony ‘must add precision or depth to the jury’s ability to reach conclusions about matters that are not within its experience.’” Jackson, d at 691 ().

See Lopez-Rios, d at 612–13 (describing improper expert gang testimony as that “which was duplicative, was related to general gang activity and affiliations, was extraneous to the factual issues before the jury, and was prejudicial”); –88 (Minn. 2003) (holding gang expert testimony to be inadmissible because it was duplicative of 11 testimony given by witnesses with first-hand knowledge, such as DeShay’s association with a gang, that the gang’s primary activity was drug trafficking, and that the

“The doctrine of stare decisis directs that we adhere to former decisions in order that there might be stability in the law.” (quotation omitted), aff’d

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Because appellant does not raise constitutional errors with respect to the court’s evidentiary rulings, “[reversal is warranted only [if] the error substantially influence^] the jury’s decision.”