Cited by

(noting that a defendant who withdraws a guilty plea faces trial on all original charges and, if convicted, faces a greater potential penalty).

(reversing this court, reinstating the defendant ’s conviction, and remand ing for another plea -withdrawal hearing because the district court erred by not letting the defendant testify about his lawyer ’s ineffectiveness at the initial plea-withdrawal hearing).

We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, and only the “rare case” merits reversal

(requiring further hearing to determine whether defendant’s attorney had coerced him into pleading guilty and whether defendant should be allowed to withdraw plea).

See State v. Kaiser , (reversing this court, reinstating the defendant’s conviction, and remanding for another plea-withdrawal hearing because the district court erred by not letting the defendant testify about his lawyer’s ineffectiveness at the initial plea-withdrawal hearing).

at 582; see also State v. Kaiser , (stating “whether or not defendant was coerced cannot be decided without the [district] court first making factual findings relating to the alleged coercion”).

The district court’s application of the fair- and-just standard “is left to the sound discretion of the [district] court,” and its decision “will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.” (quotation omitted).

Kim, d at 266; (quotation omitted) (concluding whether to permit plea withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard is within a district court’s discretion and “will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.”).

The district court’s denial of a plea-withdrawal motion “will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Kaiser , , 320 (Minn. 1991) (quotation omitted).

The decision whether to permit withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard is within a district court’s discretion and “will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.” (quotation omitted).

The decision whether to permit withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard is within a district court’s discretion and “will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he ‘ultimate decision’ of whether to allow withdrawal under the ‘fair and just’ standard is ‘left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can 4 fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.’” d 316, 320 (Minn. 1991) (quoting Kim, d at 266 (Minn. 1989)).

relied on, and mother cites to, the supreme court’s regarding coer cion in the context of a guilty plea.

“[T]he ultimate decision of whether to allow withdrawal under the [fair -and-just] standard is left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.” (quotations omitted).

For that reason, the cases on which he relies, are distinguishable.

“[T]he ‘ultimate decision’ of whether to allow withdrawal under the ‘[fair-and-just]’ standard is ‘left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.’” ().

“[T]he ‘ultimate decision’ of whether to allow withdrawal under the ‘fair and just’ standard is ‘left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.’” ().

(stating “it would be an extremely rare case” where a reviewing court would reverse denial of a guilty-plea- withdrawal motion under the fair-and-just standard where defendant pleaded guilty “in the middle of a rape trial after the complainant had testified”).

Kim, d at 266 (stating that “giving a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea before sentence would undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process”); –20 (Minn. 1991) (noting that “Kim rejected the approach of the pre-Kim decisions .

11 withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard is within the district court’s sound discretion and will be reversed “only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.”

“[T]he ‘ultimate decision’ of whether to allow withdrawal under the ‘fair and just’ standard is ‘left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.’” (quoting Kim, d at 266).

And the supreme court has noted the distinction, stating that the fair-and-just standard “is less demanding than the manifest injustice standard.” (explaining that the right to withdraw a plea for a manifest injustice applies before or after sentencing but that a district court may allow withdrawal before sentencing on the lesser showing of a fair and just reason to withdraw).

(stating that where the defendant has entered an adequately supported guilty plea, the defendant is free to move “to withdraw his plea on the ground that withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice * * * or on the ground that there was a ‘fair and just’ reason for his wanting to do so.”)

(recognizing, in the context of criminal law, that a manifest injustice occurs when a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty); cf. Lynumn v. Ill., 372 U.S. 528, 533-34, 537-38 , 83 S.Ct.

“[T]he ultimate decision of whether to allow withdrawal under the 'fair and just’ standard is ‘left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.’ ” *339 ().