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n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.” n.3 (Minn. 1998).

2, notwithstanding the LMNP’s broad challenge to the constitutionality of sections 202A.12 and 202A.13 more generally.10 n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

d 266, 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”); see also Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 801 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that appellant lacked standing to 5 challenge sign-code provisions where pr

n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

See In re Senty–Haugen, n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that cour ts should not reach constituti onal issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

(noting that we will construe- statutes to avoid a constitutional confrontation, including “to avoid potential separation of powers problems”); , 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

See In re Senty–Haugen, n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well- settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

269 n. 3 (Minn. 1998) ("It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise."); , 492-93 n. 7 (Minn.1988) (declining to reach due-process challenge to local rule providing for dismissal with prejudice because relief w

269-70 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (noting that "[i]t is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise” and refusing to decide a constitutional issue because it had not been properly raised).

In we held that, in the absence of a statutory requirement for commitment to the least restrictive alternative, there was no error in failing to make findings of fact on the existence of such an alternative.

(“Generally, we will not address a constitutional issue if there is another basis upon which the case can be decided.”); , 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

( , 732 n. 7 (Minn.2003)); , 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that the courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (we avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which we may decide a case).

269-70 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (noting general practice is to avoid constitutional ruling if case can be decided on another basis).

We address Bourke’s statutory argument first because “[o]ur general practice is to avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case can be decided.” , 732 n. 7 (Minn.2003); , 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

(deferring the constitutional issue because conviction was reversed on other grounds); , 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

269 n. 3 (Minn. 1998) ("It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

269 n. 3 (Minn. *733 1998).