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“As distinguished from a cause of action for negligent treatment, the role of expert testimony in establishing a prima facie case [under the doctrine of informed consent] is not as prominent.”

In considering the competency of an expert witness, the district court examines “both the degree of the witness’ scientific knowledge and the extent of the witness’ practical experience with the matter which is the subject of the offered testimony.” .

Paul & Minneapolis, (stating that exclusion of expert testim ony “lies within the sound disc retion of the trial court, and would be admissible at trial”).

See Reinhardt v. Colton , (indicating tha t the exclusion of expert testimony “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be reversed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or it constitutes and abuse of discretion”).

Reinhardt v. Colton , 3 (Minn. 1983).

n.1 (Minn. 1983) (noting that the standard for judgment as a matter of law “suggests that the stage of the proceeding at which a motion for [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] is brought is an inappropriate time at which to effectuate a determination regarding the admissibility of evidence”); Rochester Wood

He argues that , in relying upon the district court’s prior rulings, he chose not to lay additional foundation or call additional witnesses, and that such foundation determinations should be made when the evidence is offered, not “after the jury’s verdict has been return ed, because the latter approach substantially usurps the role of the jury.” n.1 (Minn. 1983).

claim of medical malpractice based on negligent treatment, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the standard of care recognized by the medical community as applicable to the particular defendant’s conduct; (2) that the defendant departed from that standard; (3) that the defendant’s departure from that standard was a direct cause of the patient’s injuries; and (4) damages.” (quotation omitted).

Because the award of future medical expenses was supported by the testimony of Dr. Sherman and Graham, because the award was well below the range testified to by both Dr. Sherman and Graham, and because the weighing of conflicting evidence is an issue for the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for a new trial based on the future-medical-expenses award.

“The competency of a witness to provide expert medical testimony depends upon both the degree of the witness’ scientific knowledge and the extent of the witness’ practical experience with the matter which is the subject of the offered testimony.”

Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc., , 92 n. 1 (Minn.1983) (noting that the trial court has “considerable discretion in determining the sufficiency of foundation laid for expert opinion”) (citations omitted).

or alternative program, which may be established by a showing that a reasonable person in what the physician knows or should have known to be the plaintiffs position would likely attach significance to that risk or alternative in deciding whether to consent to treatment; (3) breach of that duty; (4) causation (the undisclosed risk must materialize in harm); and (5) damages.” ().

The district court has “consid *761 erable discretion in determining the sufficiency of foundation laid for expert opinion.” , 92 n. 1 (Minn.1983).

this court stated, “the exclusion of expert medical testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be reversed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id.

See Benson v. Northern Gopher Enterprises, Inc.