Cited by

See, (explaining that section 609.04 prohibits “multiple convictions under different sections of the statute for a single criminal act”); (“[Section 609.04] bars a court from entering two convictions for one act simply because a defendant’s single act violated multiple provisions of a statute.”), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

on the basis of the same conduct.’” ()); –27 (Minn. App. 1997) (vacating three of six convictions of first- degree criminal sexual conduct where convictions were based on three distinct acts), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1997)), rev. denied (Minn. Apr.

on the basis of the same conduct.’” ()); -27 (Minn. App. 1997) (vacating three of six convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct where convictions were based on three distinct acts), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

on the basis of the same conduct.’” (d 879, 881 (Minn. 1984))); -27 (Minn. App. 1997) (vacating three of six convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct where convictions were based on three distinct acts), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

6 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

13 240, 242-43 (Minn. 1983) (holding that section 609.04 permits only one conviction when the same act resulted in four separate convictions); - 27 (Minn. App. 1997) (vacating three duplicative convictions because section 609.04 “bars a court from entering two convictions for one act simply because a defendant’ s single act violated multiple provisions of a statute”), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

tements of criminal purpose do not unify separate acts into a single course of conduct.” State v. Jones , d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014); see also State v. Barthman , (determining that the broad criminal objectiv e of “sexual gratific ation” did not unify 1 This is in contrast to cases such as State v. Spears , in which this court found that three acts of sexual assault of the same victim that all took place in defendant’s car within a 45-minute timeframe constituted a single behavioral incident.

-27 (Minn. App. 1997) (conducting a separate analysis of sentences and convictions), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

d 723, 726 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997); (noting that it is to appellant’s benefit to have his 10 The district court determined that appellant could be sentenced for each offense, and appellant received separate sentences for each

See, e.g., State v. Spears , review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997) (stating that, for sentencing purposes, multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct committed over 45 minutes were connected in time and amounted to a single behavioral incident).

“The statute bars a court from entering two convictions for one act simply because a defendant’s single act violated multiple provisions of a statute.” (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

See State v. Spears , , review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

of a multi-tier statutory scheme dealing with a particular subject, then it is an ‘included offense’ under section 609.04.”); see also State v. Spears , -27 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that defendant cannot be convicted of violations of both section 609.342, subdivisions 1(c) and 1(e)(i) because they constitute “duplicative convictions” under two different su bdivisions of the first-degree criminal- sexual-conduct statute), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

2016), (relying on defendant’s motivation “to satisfy his perverse sexual needs” to find single behavioral incident where multiple sexual acts occurred in a single afternoon) , and State v. Spears , (following Herberg’s sexual-needs rationale when “[a]ll three offenses took place in Spears’s parked car within a 45-minute period”), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).

Appellate courts “have consistently held that [Minn. Stat. §] 609.04 bars multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” -27 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997) (prohibiting multiple convictions for violating multiple provisions of a statute by commission of a single criminal act).

d 723, 725 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997) (Spears I).

rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1997) (“Spears I”); State v. Spears, C8-98-2307, 1999 WL 319022 , at *1 (Minn.App.

(sustaining *123 state’s challenge to defense’s peremptory-strike on the grounds that the defense’s use of the peremptory strike was motivated by intentional discrimination).

See, -28 (Minn.App.1997) (interpreting similar language under the repeat sex~offender statute), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).