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The test is “designed to measure whether police influence rather than the witness’s own reasoning and recollection led to the witness’s identification of the defendant.” Hooks, d at 84 ().

“[T]he reviewing court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” (quotation omitted).

The court evaluates whether “the defendant was unfairly singled out for identification” to determine if “the procedure used by the police influenced the witness identification of the defendant.”

But suppression is not required, despite use of a suggestive procedure, if the totality of the circumstances shows that the witness’s identification “has an adequate independent origin” and, therefore, “is considered to be reliable.” (quotation omitted).

Where, as here, “the facts are not in dispute and the trial court's decision is a question of law,” we “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” State v. Taylor , (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

6 We are not persuaded otherwise by the state’s contention that “a one-person show-up is not unnecessarily suggestive per se,” –62 (Minn. 1999).

If the court finds that the identific ation process was unnecessarily suggestive, it must then determine whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” (quotation om itted).

Second, if the procedure is unnecessarily suggestive, we ask whether the totality of the circumstances created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” (quotation om itted).

If the identification process is unnecessarily suggestive, we determine whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misi dentification.” State v. Taylor , (quotation omitted).

If the identification process is unnecessarily suggestive, the second part of the process requires an analysis of whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” (quotation omitted).

The first step requires the court to determine whether the identification procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive.”

A type of pretrial identification proce dure in which a suspect is conf ronted by or exposed to the victim or a witness to a crime.” n.1 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 962 (6th ed. 1990)).

If the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, a second question arises: whether the identification is nonetheless reliable when considered as part of the totality of the circumstances or, on the other hand, whether the identification created “a very substantial like lihood of irreparable misidentification.” State v. Taylor , (quotation omitted).

5 Taylor, (stating that the ultimate concern is whether the police’s procedure influenced the witness’s identification of the defendant).

First, the district court noted that “ show-ups are, by their nature, suggestive,” see State v. Taylor, 7 but determined that “ the suggestiveness inherent in the show-up was not so great as to make this an unfair lineup.” The district court reasoned that the show-up was not unnecessarily suggestive merely on the ground that Thomas was brought to the victim rather than vice versa, that Thomas had b

(stating that the ultimate concern of the unnecessarily-suggestive inquiry is whether the procedure used by police influenced the witness identification of the defendant).

But if “the facts are not in dispute and the [district] court’s *732 decision is a question of law, the reviewing court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.”

When determining whether an identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, we inquire “whether the procedure used by the police influenced the witness identification of the defendant.”