Cited by

1103, 1103 (Minn. 1895) (considering whether statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely privileged” and may not “be made the basis of an action for libel or slander”); (statements made by participants in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and “will not support a civil action for defamation”); d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (high-level agency official “has an absolute privilege, in the performance of .

1103, 1103 (Minn. 1895) (considering whether statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely privileged” and may not “be made the basis of an action for libel or slander”); (statements made by participants in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and “will not support a civil action for defamation”); d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (high-level agency official “has an absolute privilege, in the performance of .

“Absolute privilege bars liability for even ‘intentionally false statements, coupled with malice,’ while qualified privilege bars liability only if the ‘defamatory statements are publicized in good faith and without malice.’” d 179, 182 (Minn. 2014) ().

See , (recognizing the “general rule .

As a matter of public policy, some communications made in the course of a judicial proceeding are protected by absolute privilege and cannot form the basis for a defamation suit, though “[t]he absolute privilege rule is confined within narrow limits .”

Under the third element of absolute privilege, a statement is relevant if it has “reference and relation to the subject matter of the action and [it is] connected therewith[.]” Newgard, d at 306 (second alteration in original) ().

The doctrine pr ovides that “a party who files a pleading or affidavit in a judicial proceeding has absolu te immunity, though his stat ements are defamatory and malicious, if they relate to the subject of inquiry.” (quotation omitted).

Further, the district court concluded, that the arbitration panel members were protected by absolute privilege as part of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.

relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & (citing Matthis v. Kennedy , ).

A qualified privilege extends to a broader range of circumstances and, to be privileged, the statements must be made in good faith, on a proper occasion, with a proper motive, and upon reasonable or probable 4 We have applied an absolute privilege to statements made by participants in judicial proceedings, statements made by a high-level agency official in the performance of official duties, and statements made by a state trooper in a written arrest report, –37 (Minn. 1994).

" Minke v. City of Minneapolis , , 182 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Matthis v. Kennedy , 243 Minn. 219 , , 416 (1954) ).

But the application of absolute privilege is limited “to situations in which the public service or the administration of justice require s complete immunity from being called to account for language used.” see also Mahoney & Hagberg, d at 306.

“[I]n the case of a communication recognized as absolutely privileged even the presence of express malice does not destroy the privilege.” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223

The district court erred by dismissing Dering’s defamation claim against Rockstar, where there are factual i ssues outstanding and conditional privilege does not apply The fundamental basis of a defamation claim is that “one is liable for an unprivileged communication or p ublication of false and defama tory matter [that] injures the reputation of another.” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222-23

See Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 224

(citing Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 224, ).

at 62 (quoting Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223 , ).

The doctrine of absolute privilege may apply if a person voluntarily makes a statement that later is the basis of a civil action, Mahoney & Hagberg, d at 306, albeit within “narrow limits,” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223

Absolute privilege bars liability for even “intentionally false statements, coupled with malice,” while qualified privilege bars liability only if the “defamatory statements are publicized in good faith and without malice.” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223

We have defined the difference between the two kinds of privileges by stating that “[a]bsolute privilege means that immunity is given even for intentionally false statements, coupled with malice, while a qualified or conditional privilege grants immunity only if the privilege is not abused and defamatory statements are publicized in good faith and without malice.” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223

The court of appeals began its analysis by citing Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 227-28 , for the general principle that a party who files a pleading or affidavit in a judicial proceeding has absolute immunity, even for statements that are defamatory and malicious, “if they relate to the subject of inquiry.” Mahoney & (Minn.Ap

“[A] party who files a pleading or affidavit in a judicial proceeding has absolute immunity, though his statements are defamatory and malicious, if they relate to the subject of inquiry.” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 227-28 , (quotation omitted).

See Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223

“[Djefamatory matter published in the due course of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged.” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 224

Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223

See Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 227-28

See Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223

Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 224

In awarding summary judgment to respondents, the district court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 586 (1977), adopted as the law of Minnesota in Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 228 , : An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial ⅜ ⅜ * if it has some relation thereto.[ 2 ] The phrase “preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding” is interpreted in comment e to sect

The primary purpose of defamation actions is to impose liability on a defendant for injuries to reputation caused by “unprivileged communication or publication of false and defamatory matter which injures the reputation of another.” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222-23