Cited by

a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”

Unlike code pleading, notice pleading does not require a pleader “to allege facts and every element of a cause of action.”

a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” see also Minn. R. Civ.

Under that standard, a plaintiff may plead their case “by way of a broad general statement which may express conclusions rather than, as was required under code pleading, by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”

We have long held that a pleader is not “required to allege facts and every element of a cause of action.” quoted in Halva v. Minn. State Colls.

Therefore, “a pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.”

4 “A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss based on [r]ule 12.02[e] if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.”

Therefore, “[n]o longer is a pleader required to 6 allege facts and every element of a cause of action.”

See Franklin, 2022 WL 1765955, at *2 ( (“The continuing violation doctrine is most commonly applied in [employment] discrimination cases involving wrongful acts that manifest over a period of time, rather than in a series of discrete acts.”), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2001) ; –31 (Minn. 1963) (applying a similar doctrine to an action for trespass)).

& Univs., (quoting N. State s ).

citing the disclosure statute expressly would have provided much clearer notice of her claim, a pleading need only “give fair notice to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader’s theory upon which his claim for relief is based.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., (); –50 (Minn. 1997) (“Although the [plaintiffs] did not specifically name their theory of liability .

It has also been applied to trespass, -31 (Minn. 1963), and required disclosures on political campaign signs.

Further, “a pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded .” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , .

-31 (Minn. 1963) (trespass); State Dep’t of Labor & Indus.

An order dismissing a complaint under rule 12.02 is reviewed de novo and will be upheld when it is not “possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.”

by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’ ” Walsh, d at 602 ().

“[A] pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.”

t define the phrase “a matter that has no merit,” a district court cannot dismiss a civil petition without a hearing on the merits unless “it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., (quoting N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , ).

Plaintiffs may plead their case “by way of a broad general statement which may express conclusions rather than, as was required under code pleading, by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , see also Minn. R. Civ.

The purpose of the complaint is to “‘give fair notice to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disc lose the pleader’s theory upon which his claim for relief is based.’” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., ( (emphasis added in Walsh)).

“[A] pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.”

(quoting N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , (noting that because t he only factual information on a motion to dismiss is that which is disclosed by the pleadings as a whole, the dismissal function is “extremely limited”))

N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , 265 Minn. 391 , , 30-31 (1963) (addressing ongoing trespass).

N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , -31 (Minn. 1963) (trespass); Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.

Crow Wing’s breach-of-contract claim regarding the Stanton facility can only be dismissed “if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.”

N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 396

Cf. N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , 265 Minn. 391 , , 30 (1963) (stating that whether a landowner impliedly consented to allow another to enter his or her land is a question of fact).

This court will not u phold a dismissal under rule 12.02(e) “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with [appellant’s] theory, to grant the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395

We will not uphold a district court’s dismissal under rule 12.02(e) “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395

4 relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395

P. 12.02(e) allows a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under this rule, “a pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395

exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395, cf. Minn. R. Civ.

A claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395