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rmless is based upon the severity of the misconduct: in cases of “serious” prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts require a “certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before affirming”; and in cases of less serious misconduct, appellate courts consider “whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.”

ial misconduct was harmless depended on the seriousness of the 10 misconduct such that, if it was unusually serious, we would reverse unless we were certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless and that, if the misconduct was less serious, we would consider only “whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.”

“[I]n cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct,” appellate courts have “required certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before affirming.”

(stating that the two-tiered harmless-error test applies to cases where the defendant objects to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct).

“[I]n cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct,” appellate courts have “required certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before affirming.” –99, 299 n.4 (Minn. 2006) (observing that “some [Minnesota Supreme Court] cases [had] used the Caron standard to analyze unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct,” “conclud[ing] that appellate courts should use the plain error doctri

-99 (Minn. 2006); n.2 (Minn. 2023) (indicating that the two-tiered harmless-error test is applicable in cases involving objected-to p

103(a) (“Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error.”); see also State v. Caron , (stating that appellate courts review objected-to prosecutorial misconduct under a two-tiered harmless-error test).

8 “[I]n cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct,” appellate courts consider whether it is certai n beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless.

n.10 (Minn. 2011) (questioning but not deciding whether Caron’s two-tiered harmless-error test remains good law because the prosecutor did not commit misconduct of any type).

(holding that for claims of serious prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts determine whether the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but for less serious 3 We acknowledge that the waiver accompanying the stipulation did not comport with Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure

(holding that for claims of serious prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts determine whether the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt , but for less serious prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts determine whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencin

11 Objected-to Misconduct When an objection is made at trial, this court has utilized a “two-tiered harmless- error test under which the standard of review varies based on the seriousness of the misconduct.” see State v. Caron , (articulating the two-tiered standard).

d 130, 150 (Minn. 2012) (discussing State v. Caron , which sets forth the two-tiered approach); Whitson, d at 304 n.2 (stating that “[r]ecent cases have questioned whether the two-tiered Caron standard .

A. Objected-to misconduct When reviewing objected -to prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts utilize a harmless-error test—known as the Caron test—“the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.”

(creating a harmless-error standard of review for objecte d-to prosecutorial misconduct in which one level of scrutiny is applied to less serious misconduct and another 19 level is applied to more serious misconduct).

at 390 n.8 () (emphasis added).

ermining whether an error was harmless varies based upon t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e misconduct, requiring certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct was harmless in cases involving unusually ser ious prosecutorial misconduct a nd, in less serious cases, reviewing whether the misconduct likely “played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.”4

State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127

-48 (Minn. 1988); State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28, -01 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Ramey, d at 297-99.

For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, like the misconduct at issue here, there are tw o harmless-error standards of review taken from State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28, 1 The harmless- 1 The supreme court has questioned the viability of this approach, but has yet to decide that issue.

See State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28, d 197, 200 (1974).

State v. McDaniel , 9 (Minn. 2010) (citing State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127 -28, ).

State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28

There are t wo harmless -error standards of review for objected -to prosecutorial misconduct, taken from State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28, 4 The harmless-error test for “unusually serious” misconduct requires an analysis of whether the misconduct was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Nissalke , d 82, 105 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

See State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28

See State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28

See [] 298, 299 n.4 [Minn. 2006] (discussing the two-tiered approach articulated in State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28, and “leaving for another day the question of whether the Caron two-tiered approach should continue to apply to cases involving objected-to prosecutorial misconduct.”).