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The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that a “motion to present alternative- perpetrator evidence is subject to the foundation and admissibility requirements [that the supreme court] –59 (Minn. 1977).” Id.

See, d 150, 158 (Minn. 1977) (citing Olstad v. Fahse, 282 N.W.

A d 150, 158–59 (Minn. 1977).

to present an alternative perpetrator defense.

Alternative-perpetrator evidence is not admissible unless it is “coupled with other evidence having an inherent tendency to connect [the alternative perpetrator] with the actual commission of the crime.” –59 (Minn. 1977).

because he proffered sufficient evidence to show an inherent tendency to connect J.R. with the actual commission of the 2 Peritonitis is an inflammation of the membrane lining the cavity of the abdomen and covering the abdominal organs, typically caused by bacterial infection either via

19 Slutzker v. Johnson , 393 F.3d 373 (3rd Cir. 2004), which concerns the requirements for prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and a trio of cases concerning alternative- perpetrator evidence:

We review the sufficiency of the evidence based on a thorough analysis of the record, viewing the evidence in “the light most favorable to the conviction.” State v. Webb, 5 see also State v. Hawkins , (requiring a reviewing court to c onsider the evidence in a manner that is “most favorable to the state” and assume th at the jury “disbelieved” any contradictory testimony).

If the defendant satisfies this foundational requirement, the district court may, consistent with' evidentiary rules, “admit ‘evidence of a motive of the third person, to commit, the crime, threats by the third person, or other miscellaneous facts’ tending to prove the third party committed the crime.” Huff, d at 436 ().

(explaining a defendant should not “be allowed to throw strands of speculation on the wall and see if any of them will stick” (quotation omitted)); (“[E]vidence tending to incriminate another is inadmissible in the absence of proof of facts to connect that person with the crime.”).

ernative perpetrator to the commission of the crime, “ ‘it is permissible to introduce evidence of a motive of the third person to commit the crime, threats by the third person, or other miscellaneous facts which would tend to prove the third person committed the act,’ in order to cast a reasonable doubt on the state’s case.” ().

But “[p]roper foundation must be laid for the admission of such [alternative perpetrator] evidence” in order “to avoid the consideration of matters collateral to the crime.”

() (alterations in original).

The purpose of this foundational requirement is to “avoid[ ] the use of bare suspicion and safeguard^ a third person from indiscriminate use of past differences with the deceased.” ().

-59 (Minn.1977) ([E]vidence tending to prove that another person did the killing is admissible....

Jones I, d at 15-16 ; -59 (Minn.1977).