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Our function is “not to weigh the evidence, but to review the record to determine whether there was legal evidence to support the zoning authority’s decision.”

(“The basic rights of procedural due process required in [quasi-judicial] case[s] are reasonable notice of hearing and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”).

But Minnesota courts have consistently recognized that the basic rights of procedural due process required in quasi-judicial proceedings such as this are satisfied by “reasonable notice of hearing and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (“The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” (quotation omitted)).

V; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; -17 (Minn. 1978) (analyzing whether a corporate entity’s procedural due process rights were violated).

Hubbard Broad., Inc., d at 762-63 (affirming denial of permit for satellite station based on incompatibility between proposed use and municipa lity’s comprehensive plan); see also Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton , 7-18 (Minn. 1978) (determining that municipality had legally sufficient reason to deny permit to mine gravel based on inconsistency with land-use plan).

An appellate court’s function in reviewing a land-use decision is “not to weigh the evidence, but to review the record to determine whether there was legal evidence to support the zoning authority’s decision.”

(citing Barton Contracting Co., ).

“[Q]uasi-judicial proceedings do not invoke th e full panoply of procedures required in regular judi cial proceedings.” Barton Contracting Co., In c. v. City of Afton

(upholding city’s denial of a CUP even though one of five given reasons was not legally sufficient to support denial).

In Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, the supreme court reviewed a city’s denial of a special-use permit and stated: “If the decision-making body does state reasons, review will be limited to the legal sufficiency and factual basis for those reasons.”

decision.” Barton Contracting Co.

To satisfy El Deeb’s due process rights, the commission was required only to provide reasonable notice of a hearing and a reasonable opportunity to be heard because “quasi-judicial proceedings do not invoke the full panoply of procedures required in regular judicial proceedings.” Barton Contracting Co., see also In re Class A 7 License Appl.

These basic requirements persist in the land-use context, but “quasi-judicial proceedings do not invoke the full panoply of procedures required in regular judicial proceedings.” Barton Contracting Co., d 712, 716 (Minn. 1978).

Moreover, the supreme court has recognized that where, as here, a municipality acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, those proceedings “do not invoke the full panoply of procedures required in regular judicial proceedings.” Barton Contracting Co.

Paul, with quasi-judicial proceedings not requiring the “full panoply of procedures” used in “regular judicial proceedings.”

Upon review of a city’s decision, our function is “not to weigh the evidence, but to review the record to determine whether there was legal evidence to support the zoning authority’s decision.”

See, also, in which we independently examined the action of the local governing body to determine its propriety, rather than merely reviewing the decision of the district court for clear error.

“[T]he simple fact that community members oppose a landowner using his land for a particular purpose is not a legally sufficient reason for denying a special-use permit.” Barton Contracting Co.

See, (stating that quasi-judicial proceedings regarding a special-use permit for property “do not invoke the full panoply of procedures required in regular judicial proceedings”); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 , 95 S.Ct.

716 n. 3 (Minn.1978) (noting that right of cross-examination was waived because transcript contains no indication that any request to cross-examine was made).

-19 (Minn.App.1986) (concluding that “[t]he simple fact that community members oppose a landowner using his land for a particular purpose is not a legally sufficient reason for denying a special use permit”) (quoting Barton Contracting Co., ).

Furthermore, quasi-judicial proceedings, such as considering a CUP application, do not generally invoke “the full panoply of procedures required in regular judicial proeeedings[;]” the applicable rights of due process are “reasonable notice of hearing and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” Barton Contracting Co.

In Barton Contracting Co., we acknowledged that “[t]he statements made at such a public hearing [for a conditional use permit], unlike a regular judicial proceeding, are not given under oath and are not limited by the traditional rules of evidence.

-18 (Minn.1978) (upholding denial of special use permit to expand operation of gravel pit to adjacent land where the city’s land use plan “is permeated with evidence of a strong desire to preserve the rural character and unique scenic beauty of Afton and the St.