Cited by

(stating that where “there was a great deal of conflicting testimony and the factual determinations must have been difficult .

to argue that “the defendant should not be singled out as more or less believable because of his status as the accused.” However, in Underwood the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a jury’s conviction due to five cumulative errors, and only one error was the jury instruction on the defendant’s c

where the probative value of the impeachment evidence may be outweighed by its tendenc y to prejudice or confuse the jury.” see also Minn. R. Evid.

the supreme court stated that a defendant’s attorney “has a certain responsibility to limit the cross-examination [of a law- enforcement officer] so as to avoid areas which he knows may lead to objectionable testimony” and may not “bootstrap a reversal by eliciting improper testimony from a prosecutio

(“We do not mean to imply that a defense counsel could bootstrap a reversal by eliciting improper testimony from a prosecution witness on cross-examination.

Indeed, as support for their cumulative-error argument.

“ [T]he state has a duty to properly prepare its own witnesses prior to trial.” d 337, 342 (Minn. 1979).

12 the pendency of a civil action for damages by the witness against the accused.”

“[T]he state has a duty to properly prepare its own witnesses prior to trial.”

This is one reason our caselaw has recognized that “the state has a duty to properly prepare its own witnesses prior to trial.”

This is so because a prosecutor “has a duty to properly prepare its own witnesses prior to trial.” d 337, 342 (Minn. 1979).

This is so because a prosecutor “has a duty to properly prepare its own witnesses prior to trial.”

The prejudicial testimony came from the state’s witness, a public official, and the prosecution is entirely responsible for its 11 presence in the record.”); (stating that the state has a duty to prepare its witness).

review denied (Minn. May 29, 2001), to argue that the state failed to ensure that L.H.

(reversing based on cumulative error where there was substantial conflicting testimony and difficult factual determinations).

This is not a “very close factual case.” -41 (Minn.2000) (“Unlike Underwood , the facts in the instant case are not close.

(“To avoid the problem occasioned by the blurting out of [prejudicial] testimony, the state has a duty to properly prepare its own witnesses prior to trial.”).

d 337, 342 (Minn. 1979) (stating that, to avoid the problem occasioned by a witness blurting out objectionable testimony, the state has a duty before trial to properly prepare its witnesses).

to support his argument that plain error affecting his substantial rights was made by the district court.

And in State v. Underwood we reversed a conviction in a very close factual case, concluding that “any error, however small, may have prejudiced [the] defendant.”

this court reviewed a very close factual case.

The prejudicial testimony came from the state’s witness, a public official, and the prosecution is entirely responsible for its presence in the record.”); (stating that the state has a duty to prepare its witness).