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This right can be implicated when the jury is exposed to “potentially prejudicial material.”

When a jury is inadvertently exposed to potentially prejudicial material, “[t]he proper procedure for reviewing a jury verdict is to determine from juror testimony what outside influences were improperly brought to bear upon the jury and then estimate their probable effect on a hypothetical average jury.”

Kivi contends that this court should review the district court’s ruling by applying the four-factor test set forth in Stat e v. Cox

(stating considerations for reviewing the effect of outside influences on a jury verdict).

See State v. Cox , -60 (Minn. 1982) (reasoning that the district court did not err by denying a motion for mistrial after the jury heard a sheriff say that they believed the defendant was guilty because there was “no reasonable possibility that the sheriff’s remark would affect the verdict of an average jury given the nature of

(explaining that a defendant must show that the information not only made its way into the jury room, but infected the verdict); (explaining that “[t]he relevant factors to be considered by this court, in an independent evaluation of the verdict, are the nature and source of the prejudicial matter, the number of jurors exposed to the influence, the weight of evidence properly before the jury, and the likelihood that curati

ce between “the part of the hearing that was closed to the public” and “the entire hearing .” Jackson has not shown why it would be necessary to repeat the testimony from the 10 unaffected jurors, especially when the focus of a Schwartz hearing is not a juror’s particular mental process, but the “probable effect [of the extraneous information] on a hypothetical average jury.” .

In denying the petition, the district court analyzed the prospective juror’s and conclude d that the statements were not unfairly prejudicial.

“The exposure of a jury to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude, because it deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury and the right to confront and cross-examine the source of the material.”

Jaros points us to State v. Cox , and asserts that the State bears the burden of proving that Detective Shirkey's opinion testimony was not prejudicial.

(stating that exposing a jury “to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude because it deprives a d efendant of the right to an im partial jury”).

(quoting State v. Cox , ).

the right to a fair trial, the relevant factors this court considers include: “the nature and source of the prejudicial matter, the number of jurors exposed to the influence, the weight of evidence properly before the jury, and the likelihood that curative measures were effective in 6 reducing the prejudice.” (), review denied (Minn. May 29, 2001).

We have stated that the proper procedure is to “determine from juror testimony what outside influences were improperly brought to bear upon the jury.”

We have said: "[t]he exposure of a jury to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude, because it deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury and the right to confront and cross-examine the source of the material.” (citing Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 , 87 S.Ct.

See Crandall, d at 711 (recognizing a rebuttable presumption of prejudice when alternate inadvertently joined the regular jury members for the first 20 minutes of deliberations); -59 (Minn.1982) (statements of a court official made in the presence of the jury that affected the merits of.

“The exposure of a jury to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude, because it deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury and the right to confront and cross-examine the source of the material.”

llant argues that this testimony, which the witnesses testified to despite the district court’s earlier ruling that such testimony was inadmissible, denied him his “constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.” Jury exposure “to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude, because it deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury.” (citation omitted).

-60 (Minn.1982) (holding that the state successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice stemming from a court official’s improper statements about the merits of a case in front of the jury).

(“exposure of a jury to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magni *195 tude”).

See, -11 (Minn.1994) (holding that certain juror misconduct, although not warranting a new trial by itself, provided a “secondary basis” for decision to grant a new trial); (“The exposure of a jury to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude, because it deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury and the right to confront and cross-examine the source of the material.”).