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To assess whether the district court abused its discretion, we “look to past sentences received by other offenders,” id., and rely on our “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts, ” -47 (Minn. 1982).

And we rely on our “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” - 47 (Minn. 1982).

–47 (Minn. 1982) (stating that determining whether severe aggravating circumstances exist “must be based on our collective, collegial D-8 experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts”); (incorporati

An appellate court’s decision of “whether a particular durational departure by a [district court] judge was justified ‘must be based on our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.’” (-47 (Minn. 1982)); rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

In assessing whether the district court abused its discretion, we “look to past sentences received by other offenders,” id., and rely on our “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts,” -47 (Minn. 1982).

We rely “on our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” -47 (Minn. 1982).

In so doing, we use “our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” –47 (Minn. 1982).

(quotation omitted); see also Weaver, d at 573-74 (“In the final analysis, an appellate court’s decision whether a particular durational departure is justified ‘must be based on [its] collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.’” (-47 (Minn. 1982))).

In so doing, we rest our determination “on our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” -47 (Minn. 1982).

(affirming departure when the defendant terrorized a young child after kidnapping her from her front yard); Dillon, d at 602 (affirming departure when the defendant physically assaulted his wife and caused her to suffer 4 We observe that two of the jury’s 18 special-verdict findings rel

C/D - 4 omitted); see also Weaver, d at 573–74 (“In the final analysis, an appellate court’s decision whether a particular durational departure is justified ‘must be based on [its] collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.’” (–47 (Minn. 1982))).

See Rairdon, d at 327 (citing State v. 13 Norton, -47 (Minn. 1982)).

The supreme court has also stated, in dictum, that “ the fact that [a] victim had no idea in which county the sexual abuse occurred was not a valid reason for not charging defendant with criminal sexual conduct.” n.1 (Minn. 1982).

“ ‘[P]articular cruelty’ involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty ‘of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.’ ” ().

While there is no “easy-to-apply test” to make this de termination, our decision “must be based on our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” State v. Norton , –47 (Minn. 1982); see also Dillon, d at 597 (applying test at this court).

(quoting State v. Norton , , 146-47 (Minn. 1982) ).

10 -47 (Minn. 1982), where the supreme court held that the appellant’s sentence, which was three times the presumptive sentence, was permissible.

But “there is no clear line that marks the boundary between ‘aggravating circumstances’ justifying a double departure and ‘severe aggravating circumstances’ justifying a greater than double departure.”

The supreme court has explained that “there is no clear line that marks the boundary between ‘aggravating circumstances’ justifying a double departure and ‘severe aggravating circumstances’ justifying a greater than double departure.”

In the final analysis, an appellate court’s decision whether a particular durational departure is justified “must be based on *574 [its] collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” -47 (Minn.1982).

In the final analysis, an appellate court’s decision whether a particular durational departure is justified “must be based on [its] collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” -47 (Minn.1982).

ugh the supreme court acknowledged early on that “[t]here is no easy-to-apply test to use in making this decision [to impose a departure that more than doubles the sentence], and [that] there is no clear line that marks the boundary between ‘aggravating circumstances’ justifying a double departure and ‘severe aggravating circumstances’ justifying a greater than double departure,” the court has not been greatly deferential to the district court’s severity determinations.

d compelling reason to depart, including particular cruelty); (explaining that in “the final analysis, our decision whether a particular durational departure by a trial judge was justified ‘must be based on our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts’ ” (-47 (Minn.1982))).

16, 1984), and its “collective, collegial experience” that a sanction is disproportionate to the severity of the offense, State v. Behl, 573 * review denied (Minn. Mar.

See, (child snatched from neighborhood park); (young child snatched from own yard).

-18 (Minn.1983); -77 (Minn.1982); , 146 n. 3 (Minn.1982).

Such a decision “must be based on our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” -47 (Minn.1982).

There is no clear line past which some aggravating circumstances become severe, and “[t]here is no easy-to-apply test to use in making this decision.”