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The rule “is not a purely mechanistic test driven by the prosecution’s exercise of its discretion in charging decisions.” (quotation 11 omitted).

(citing State v. Marquardt , -51 (Minn. 1980)) .

In State v. Rhoades, we stated that a defendant “convicted of multiple counts of possession of child pornography as part of a single behavioral incident that involves images of multiple victims may be sentenced consecutively on each count under the multiple-victim [rule].”

State v. Rhoades , - 19 (Minn. 2018) (describing the multiple-victim rule) .

J.C.L.’s reliance on State v. Rhoades , for this proposition is also unavailing.

s that , even if Rowland’s acts of possession constituted a sing le behavioral incident, the sentences are proper because a defendant may be sentenced for multiple offenses stemming from a singl e behavioral incident where “(1) the offenses involve multiple victims; and (2) the multiple sentencing does not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant ’s conduct.” State v. Rhoades

d 135, 139 (Minn. App. 2004).

district court generally may not impose more than one sentence for multiple offenses committed in a single behavioral incident, the imposition of multiple sentences does not run afoul of section 609.035, subdivision 1, “ when (1) the offenses involve multiple victims; and (2) the multiple sentencing does not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

“A district court’s 6 decision regarding perm issive, consecutive sentencing w ill not be disturbed unless the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

24, 2012); (affirming five convictions for possession of child pornography on a single computer).

We will not disturb a district court’s broad discretion regarding permissive consecutive sentencing “unless the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”