Cited by

“An error in the exclusion of evidence is grounds for a new trial if it appears that the evidence might reasonably have changed the result of the trial if it had been admitted.” (quotation omitted).

In fact, the supreme court expressly rejected the argument of the dissent in that case “that it might not have been possible for the [facility] to get [the resident] to the emergency department quickly enough to avoid her death.” Id.; n.10, 217 (Minn. 2007) (concluding, in the context of the admissibility of expert testimony, that expert testimony that reporting abuse to authorities was the standard of care “would have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the accepted standard of care requ

tablish a prima face case of medical malpractice “a plaintiff must typically introduce expert testimony demonstrating: (1) the standard of care in the medical community applicable to the particular defendant’s conduct; (2) that the defendant departed from the standard of care; and (3) that the departure from the standard of care directly caused the plaintiff’s injury.”

“An error in the exclusion of evidence is grounds for a new trial if it appears that the evidence ‘might reasonably have changed the result of the trial if it had been admitted.’ ” (quoting Poppenhagen v. Sornsin Constr.

(quoting Poppenhagen v. Sornsin Constr.

Liebsch, d at 879; see also Minn. R. Civ.

(“To require a new trial, the wrongfully excluded evidence must have had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.”).

See, d 200, 209 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that Minnesota courts grant motions to dismiss when a claim is premised upon a statute without an express or implied private cause of action).

d 200, 216 (Minn. 2007).

providers, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of malpractice by “introduc[ing] expert testimony demonstrating: (1) the standard of care in the medical community applicable to the particular defendant’s conduct; (2) that the defendant departed from the standard of care; and (3) that the departure from the standard of care directly caused the plaintiff’s injury.”

“A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.”

A new trial is required only if the improperly excluded evidence “had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.” Becker v. Mayo F ound.

103(a); (stating offer of proof is a prerequisite to appellate review of the exclusion of evidence (citing Minn. R. Evid.

v. State , (“Minnesota Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors Act”), with, e.g. , (“Child Abuse Reporting Act”).

See Cocchiarella, d at 624; (stating that whether a statute creates a private cause of action is a question of statutory interpretation).

“[W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.” (quotation omitted).

And the supreme court has stated that “[a] statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.”

Becker v. Mayo Foundation , -219 (Minn. 2007) (granting new trial because court did not know which aspects of Mayo’s care jury found to be negligent).

“A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” see also Bruegger v. Faribault Cty.

The erroneous exclusion of evidence is prejudicial if “the evidence ‘might reasonably have changed the result of the trial if it had been admitted.’” (quoting Poppenhagen v. Sornsin Constr.

“A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” d 200, 207 (Minn. 2007); see also Bruegger v. Faribault Cty.

“A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” 13 (Minn. 2007).

A district court considers certain factors when determining whether a special relationship exists, including “the vulnerability and dependency of the individual, the power exerted by the defendant, and the degree to which the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of her ordinary means of protection.”

684, 687 (1932))); (“Where a case is close on the facts, rejection of competent and material evidence is reversible error.” (quotation omitted)).

“Principles of judicial restraint preclude [the courts] from creating a new statutory cause of action that does not exist at common law where the legislature has not either by the statute’s express 7 terms or by implication provided for civil tort liability.” (quotation omitted).

9, 2013); Sorenson v. St.

(holding that the standard of care in medical-malpractice cases “is a question of fact for the jury”).

A district court considers certain factors when determining whether a special relationship exists, including “the vulnerability and dependency of the individual, the power exerted by the defendant, and the degree to which the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of her ordinary means of protection.”

A. Civil Statutes “A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.”