Cited by

But it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000)).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake

Under Fourth Amendment caselaw, one such exception exists when an officer conducts “a brief, investigatory stop when the officer ha s a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Lugo , ().

The statute is characterized as “a general prohibition on the possession of firearms in public because [a]nyone having a firearm in a public place may be prosecuted if he has no permit.” State v. Timberlake , (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).

In Fourth Amendment caselaw, it is well-established that an officer performs official duties when he conducts “a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” ().

Reasonable, articulabl e suspicion exists if the po lice officer can “articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable - suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” State v. Davis , (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,”

(quoting State v. Timberlake , d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008)).

One exception to the warrant requirement is tha t a police officer may “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer must articulate a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

While the reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, “[p]olice must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

Police must only show that the stop was based on more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high” and “is met when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotations omitted).

See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269-70, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378 (2000)

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard “is less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence, [as] it requires at least a minimal level of objective ju stification for [expanding the scope of] the stop.” (quotation omitted).

That standard is met when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her expe rience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake , (quotations and citations omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that this same standard applies when evaluating “the reasonableness of searches and seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (

But even if our statement was an attempt to import the substantial-compliance rule from the two Ninth Circuit decisions we cited and apply it to our own substitute-service rule, n.7 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State ex.

The stop must be based on “more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quotations omitted).

The reasonable- suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotation omitted).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)

In order to seize an individual, “[p]olice must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

Griffin argues that the search was not supported by reasonable suspicion because “neither informant had a track record of providing reliable information in the past so there was no inference to be made that the informants were currently reliable.” But “[w]e presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” 5 (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion required must be based on more than a mere “hunch.”