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“A guilty verdict alone is not a conviction.”

While the district court’s orally pronounced sentence prevails over an inconsistent record due to clerical error, appellate courts look to the offi cial judgment of conviction in the district court file “as conclu sive evidence of whether an o ffense has been formally adjudicated.” (quotation omitted); (concluding that the district court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over a writte n sentencing order if the two conflict).

1, see, -74 (Minn. 2007) (defining second-degree intentional murder and first-degree aggravated robbery as lesser-included offenses of first -degree felony murder).

Additionally, “[w]hen the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act the court is to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” Spann v. State , (quotation omitted); State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W .2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).

The supreme court, however, has “held that an appellant does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing.” Spann v. State

See Spann v. State , 10 (Minn. 2007) (stating that the offi cial judgment of conviction is “conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated”).

Spann v. State , , 573 (Minn. 2007).

An offender does not forfeit “claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing.”

See Spann v. State , (stating that an appellant does not waive his ri ght to challenge an unauthorized s e n t e n c e o n a p p e a l b y failing to raise the issue at sentencing).

(noting that written judgment of conviction provides “conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated”).

Spann v. State , , 573-74 (Minn. 2007).

(stating that an appellant does not waive his right to challenge an unauthori zed sentence on appeal by failing to raise the issue at sentencing).

Spann v. State , , 573 (Minn. 2007).

(stating that the failure to raise the same-behavioral-incident challenge at sentencing did not result in forfeiture).

(holding defendant “does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing”).

See Spann v. State , (“When the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act the court is to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” (quotation omitted)).

See Spann v. State , (stating that “an appellant does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing”); see also Minn. R. Crim.

Appellate courts “look to the official judgment of conviction in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.” (quotations omitted).

“When the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act, the court is to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” (quotation omitted).

“When the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act the court is to adjudicate formally and impose sent ence on one count only.” Spann v. State , (quotation omitted).

See *467 Spann v. State , , 573 (Minn. 2007) (noting that a written judgment of conviction provides "conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated" (quoting State v. Pflepsen , , 766 (Minn. 1999) ) ).

This court “look[s] to the official judgment of conviction in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.” (quotations omitted).

See Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (authorizing modification); see, e.g., Spann v. State , -74 (Minn. 2007) (vacating convictions for lesser- included offenses).

“[A]n appellant does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing.”

(“[A]n appellant does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing.”).

“When the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act the court is to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” Spann v. State , (quotation omitted).

(stating that a reviewing court may “look to the official judgment of conviction in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated” (quotations omitted)).

“When the defendant is convicted on 6 more than one charge for the same act the court is to ad judicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” Spann v. State , (alterations omitted) (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts “look to the official judgme nt of conviction in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.” (quotation omitted ).

1(4), defines “[a]n included offense” as “[a] crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved.” Additionally, “[w]hen the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act the court is to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” (alterations omitted) (quotation 17 omitted)

The supreme court, however, has “held that an appellant does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing.” (noting that a defendant cannot waive objection to Double Jeopardy violations).

d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (directing this court to examine the warrant of commitment to determine whether an offense has been formally adjudicated).

(noting that appellate courts may look to the judgment of conviction to determine if an offense has been formally adjudicated).

“When the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act the court is to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

Johnson contends that although the “typical procedure in situations involving impermissible multiple convictions or sentences is to vacate the conviction for the lesser-degree offense or to vacate the less severe sentence,” see, –74 (Minn. 2007), vacating the third-degree conviction and upholding the first-degree conviction may violate her due-process rights in this case.