Cited by

See, d 454, 463 (Minn. 2007) (denying ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim “without prejudice to [appellant’s] right to raise them in a postconviction proceeding”).

(denying defendant’s ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim when the claim required examination of facts not in the record and preserving defendant’s right to raise the claim in a postconviction proceeding).

(denying defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim when the claim required examination of facts not in the record and preserving defendant’s right to raise them in a postconviction proceeding).

neffective -assistance-of-counsel claim “requires additional factfinding,” such as when the evaluating court “needs to hear testimony from the defendant [and] his or her trial attorney,” the claim “is properly raised in a petition for postconviction relief, even though it was known at the time of direct appeal.” (denying defendant’s claims about counsel that required consideration of facts not in the trial record without prejudice to the defendant’s right to raise the claims in a postconviction

(“[The defendant’s] claims about his counsel’s investigation and witness contacts require consideration of facts not in the trial record.

d, as to Post’s complaints regarding his attorney’s performance, “[t]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must demonstrate that representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Jackson , (quotation omitted).

“An appellant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of proof on that claim.”

d 454, 460–61 (Minn. 2007) (holding that there was sufficient evidence that a victim’s murder was reasonably foreseeable when two codefendants entered a store armed with a 15 high-powered assault rifle, two codefendants sought out their third codefendant because of his dangerous reputation, and the appellant knew the

eral factors in determ ining whether a failure to instruct on corroboration of accomplice testimony constitutes reversible error, including whether the accomplice testified in exchange for leni ency, whether the accomplice’s testimony was emphasized in the prosecution’s closing argument, and whether the accomplice’s 12 testimony was corroborated by significant evidence.” ().

Although the weakness of Baker’s tria l testimony is not corroborating evidence per 15 Further, in this case, considerable ev idence corroborates Baker’s plea hearing testimony.9 (considering whether the accomplice’s testimony was co rroborated by significant evidence).

The petitioner “bears the burden of proof on that claim.”

See State v. Jackson , , 463 (Minn. 2007) (denying ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that required consideration of facts that were not in the record).

(noting that general instructions on credibility alert the jury to conflicting motivations for witnesses’ testimony).

(noting that general instructions on credibility alert the jury to conflicting motivations for witnesses’ testimony).

Similarly, in State v. Jackson, the supreme court denied appellant’s ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim because his allegations about his counsel’s investigation and witness contacts “require[d] consideration of facts not in the trial record.”

“To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must demonstrate that representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

(“Jackson’s claims about his counsel’s investigation and witness contacts require consideration of facts not in the 13 trial record.

(“Jackson’s claims about his counsel’s investigation and witness contacts require consideration of facts not in the trial record.

–61 (Minn. 2007) (holding that murder was reasonably foreseeable when the defendant attempted to rob a store with an assault rifle and a person he knew was “crazy enough” to do anything); Pierson, d at 789 (stating that “evidence indicating [that] the victim was murdered during the commission of an ag

An appellant seeking to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “bears the burden of proof on that claim.”

–58, 460–61 (Minn. 2007) (holding that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction of murder charged under section 609.05, subdivision 2, where “[defendant], as an accomplice to the attempted robbery, was aware of the basic details of the plan to use force or to threaten the use of force” and knew tha

See, –61 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of aiding-and-abetting first-degree murder while attempting to commit aggravated robbery, based on evidence that the defendant, “as an accomplice .

“[G]ratuitous testimony about a defendant’s gang membership or bad character may be unduly prejudicial.”

A person seeking to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “bears the burden of proof on that claim.”

A person alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “bears the burden of proof on that claim.”

2 The state argues that “it is also relevant that the jury was properly instructed on evaluating witness credibility.” (noting that an “adequate general instruction on the credibility of witnesses” may mitigate the prejudicial effect of the district court’s failure to give an accomplice-testimony instruction).

(stating that “factors such as defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, defendant’s close association with the principal before and after the crime, defendant’s lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and defendant’s flight from the scene of the crime” may reasonably support a co

“Evidence should not be admitted if it is irrelevant or if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential of the evidence to prejudice the jury.” -63 (Minn.2007).

-65 (Minn.2006); Lee, d at 316-17 .

our supreme court indicated that it had previously applied the "harmless-error” d at 316 , without a discussion of whether that was the appropriate standard of review.