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The appellant bears the burden to overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” (citation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting judicial review is “highly deferential” to counsel’s performance).

The burden of proof on this prong rests with the appellant, who must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that judicial review should be “highly deferential” to counsel’s performance).

The burden of proof on this prong rests with the appellant, who must overcome the 11 “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that judicial review should be highly deferential to counsel’s performance).

The burden of proof on this prong rests with the appellant, who must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that judicial review should be “highly deferential” to counsel’s performance).

Triebwasser must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

Under the first element of the Strickland test, there is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

To satisfy the first prong, the appellant must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” 18

“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007).

A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

Gail v. State , (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must contain more than “conclusory, argumentative assertions without factual support ”).

“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an appellant must show that (1) “his attorney’s performance fell be low an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” Gail v. State , see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 20 64, 2068 (1984).

“To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that (1) ‘his attorney’ s performance fell below an object ive standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) ‘a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.’” State v. Luby , ( ).

Generally, an ineffective-assistance claim requires that a defendant show that (1) “his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.

or a criminal defendant to succeed on an ineffective -assistance-of- counsel claim, the defendant must show that: (1) “his [or her] attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness[,]” and (2) “a reasonable probabil ity exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” () (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2067 (1984)).

Wright , d at 91 (quoting Gail v. State , , 248 (Minn. 2007) ).

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that (1) “his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692 , 104 S.Ct.

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) “his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct.

A petitioner “has the burden of proof” to overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

Gail v. State (Gail II), -46 (Minn. 2007).

The defendant must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

Appellant “has the burden of proof and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

Counsel’s performance is presumed to be reasonable, and the burden of providing the appellate court with a record to establish any alleged errors in counsel’s performance is the claimant’s. State v. Carlson, 281 Minn. 564, 566, -49 (claimant had not “provided any factual support for his assertions .

The burden of proof on this claim rests with the defendant, who must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”

A defendant must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s 3 performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (observing that judicial review should be “highly deferential” to counsel’s performance).