Cited by

when a party has not raised the issue, we can question a party’s standing on our own motion.” (citation omitted)); (“The question of standing, which can be raised by this court on its own motion, is essential to 10 our exercise of jurisdiction.”); see also, –75, 174 n.3 (Minn. App. 2007) (addressing a party’s standing after requesting supplemental briefing on standing where no party had raised the issue).

In any event, “[a]n essential element of jurisdiction is standing,” Minn. Voters All., d at 167, such that standing may be addressed on the court’s own initiative

Servs., (declining to consider documents “created after the commissioner’s decision” and thus “not part of the appellate record”); In re Block , (granting motion to strike extrarecord documents that post -dated decision subject to certiorari review).

We do not base our decisions on matters outside the record on appeal and do “not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.” -83 (Minn. 1988); d 166, 177 (Minn. App. 2007) (granting a motion to strike documents not considered by decision-maker who made the decision being reviewed).

App. P. 110; (granting motion to strike documents not considered by decision-maker).

App. P. 110.01, 115.04; (“Certiorari is, by its nature, a review based solely upon the record.”); (granting motion to strike documents not considered by decision - maker).

- 83 (Minn. 1988); (noting “the record in a certiorari appeal consists of the papers filed, the exhibits, and transcripts” (citing Minn. R. Civ.

v. U-Haul Co., -77 (Minn. App. 2007)

-79 (Minn. App. 2007) (-583 (Minn. 1988).

“[T]he record in a certiorari appeal consists of the pape rs filed, the exhibits, and transcripts.” (citing Minn. R. Civ.

201(b); see In re Block , (granting motion to strike reference to documents not in the record and declining to take judicial notice).

“For a challenge to a CUP to succeed, there must be a showing that the proposal did not meet one of the standards set out in the [o] rdinance and that the grant of the CUP was an abuse of discretion.” In re Block , -78 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted).

(“A court may take judicial notice of the course of the calendar.”); (“An appellate court may take judicial notice of a fact for the first time on ap peal.” (quotation omitted)).

(quotation omitted) (holding that a governing body’s decision is arb itrary and capricious where it “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem”).

Moreover, this court has reasoned that judicial notice may not be “used as a substitute for adjudicating specific facts without a hearing.” In re Block

petitioned for certiorari review.2 AHS contends that its challenge to the initial licensure is not time-barred because the 2017 renewal was based on the 2015 initi al-licensure determination that Rowell had 2 Despite being neither the licensor nor the li censee, AHS has standing to seek review of the board’s licensing decision under

“The standard of review is a deferential one, as counties have wide latitude in making decisi ons about special use permits .” In re Block , d 166, 177 (Minn. App. 2007).

In re Block , –78 (Minn. App. 2007).

See Graphic Commc’ns Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS Caremark Corp., n.2 (Minn. 2014) (declining to take judicial notice and noting courts should act cautiously when asked to take judicial notice of a fact); (cautioning against taking judicial notice of facts on websites), review denied (Minn. Sep.

(“The entity seeking standing must have a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court, and the goal of this requirement is to ensure that issues before the courts will be vigorously and adequately presented.” (quotations omitted)).

See Thiele, d at 582; (declining to address preemption issue when it was not considered by the district court and raised for the first time in a reply brief).

d 166, 176-77 (Minn. App. 2007) (granting motion to strike documents in a party’s appendix and appellate brief that were not contained in the record below).2 Affirmed; motion to supplement the record denied and motion to strike granted in part.

(reversing issuance of a CUP for a dog breeding facility as arbitrary and capricious when the county failed to take a “hard look” at whether to approve CUP condition requiring dogs to be debarked); Yeh v. Cnty.

“For a challenge to a CUP to succeed, there must be a showing that the proposal did not meet one of the standards set out in the Ordinance and that the grant of the CUP was an abuse of discretion.” -78 (Minn. App. 2007) (citations omitted).

See id.; –79 (Minn. App. 2007).

“An appellate court will review a county’s decision to approve a CUP independently to see whether there was a reasonable basis for the decision, or whether the county acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capri *83 ciously.” (quotation omitted).

In support of its position, appellant relies on

1, the facts that we may consider on certiorari review are circumscribed by the scope of *325 our review, namely, whether the commissioner reached a legally correct outcome when applying the appropriate standard of review to the record before it, (Minn.App.