Cited by

(citing Von Moltke v. Gillies , 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948)

overruled on other grounds 12

plea occurred either while her case was suspended or when there were serious doubts as to her competency, defense counsel’s decision not to move to withdraw her guilty plea was not objectively 1 Appellant maintains that her attorneys’ deficient performance is established by their failure to honor her request to withdraw her guilty ple a prior to sentencing pursuant to Anderson v. State

In the plea- bargaining context, “[a] defendant who receive s advice that is so substandard that it prevents her from making a knowing and un derstanding decision regarding her plea receives constitutionally deficient advice under the first prong of Strickland.” review denied (Minn. Nov.

s conduct falls below an objectively reasonable standard if he provides inaccurate or misleading advice that affects a defendant’s decision to accept or reject a plea offer, or if he provides advice “that is so substandard that it prevents [the defendant] from making a knowing and understanding decision regarding” a plea

overruled on other grounds by Wheeler v. State

Id.; see Coolen v. State , 288 Minn. 44, 50 -51, (rejecting postconviction petitioner’s plea-withdrawal request that was based on an alleged promise of a lenient sentence, that “directly contradict [ed] his own testimony given under oath at the time of his guilty plea”); (rejecting postconviction petitioner’s argument that attorney’s failure to advise the defendant of sentencing ramifications demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel when the petitioner’s claim was contradicted by her plea

Anderson v. State , , 905 (Minn. App. 2008).

d 901, 907-08 (Minn. App. 2008).

See Anderson v. State , -06 (Minn. App. 2008) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the district court promised a shorter sentence where the record was silent on the issue and the plea petition did not include evidence of other agreed-upon te rms or promises), review denied (Minn. Nov.

9 Impermissible participation in plea negotiations has been characterized as a district court’s “direct involvement in the negotiations, its imposition of a plea agreement, or its promise to impose a particular sentence.”

What Thomas is really requesting is an opportunity to have the district court now consider the motion that he withdrew, and he asks that this court remand this case so that the district court can evaluate his motion under the fair-and-just standard.2 We will not 2 Thomas contends that a

(stating that a manifest injustice occurs when a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent).

(stating that a manifest justice occurs when a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent).

d 901, 907 (Minn. App. 2008).

But a party’s “sworn duty to tell the truth, as directed by the oath, is too fundamental and obvious an obligation to be dismissed by contrary advice to violate it, even if suggested or encouraged by her attorney.”

“The range of bases upon which a motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing may be granted is broad, not limited by the rule.”

This court has noted that “[a]lthough the line between [the manifest-injustice and fair-and-just] standards is not always precisely applied in caselaw, the standards are distinct.”

-08 (Minn.App.2008) (stating that advice to lie did not constitute ineffective assistance because, among other reasons, there was no prejudice).

-06 (Minn.App.2008) (noting absence of any promise in written plea petition in rejecting claim of improper district court involvement in plea negotiation).