Cited by

5(b); (stating that when a statute does not specify each party’s burden of proof, “[t]he general rule is that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking to benefit from a statutory provision”).

(“Identification of the applicable burden and standard of proof presents questions of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.”).

Although the statute is silent as to who bears the burden, it generally “rests on the party seeking to benefit from a statutory provision.”

“‘Identification of the applicable burden and standard of proof presents questions of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.’” ().

[3] whether the 14 procedures used were constitutionally sufficient.”

“Identification of the applicable burden and standard of proof presents questions of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.”

(stating that when a statute does not specify each party’s burden of proof, “[t]he general rule is that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking to benefit from a statutory provision”).

(stating that, when a statute does not specify the burden of proof, “[t]he general rule is that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking to benefit from a statutory provision”).

14 See C.O. v. Doe , , 352 (Minn. 2008) ("The general rule is that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking to benefit from [the] statutory provision."); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd.

See C.O. v. Doe , , 352 (Minn. 2008).

“Identification of the applicable burden and standard of proof presents questions of law, which we review de novo.” C.O. v. Doe

“To determine whether a party has a due process claim, we conduct two inquiries, first determining whether the party has a protectable liberty or property interest with which the state interfered and, if so, then determining whether the procedures used were constitutionally sufficient.”

(stating that when a statute does not specify the burden of proof as between the parties, “[t]he general rule is that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking to benefit from a statutory provision”).

“The district court’s function on a motion for summary judgment is not to decide issues of fact, but solely to determine whether genuine factual issues exist.” DLH, (“[S]ummary judgment is not a means of deciding cases in which the facts are disputed.”).

353– 4 54 (Minn. 2008) (stating that “[w]hen the legislature has not prescribed a standard for statutorily-created causes of action, this is regarded as a signal that the legislature intended the preponderance of the evidence standard to apply,” and directing d

(stating that when a statute does not specify the burden of proof as between the parties, “[t]he general rule is that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking to benefit from a statutory provision”).

“Whether due process is required in a particular case is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

-53 (Minn.2008) (stating that when a statutorily created cause of action does not identify the applicable burden and standard of proof, the party seeking relief from the statute generally bears the burden of proof under the preponderance of the evidence standard).

Civil proceedings “typically employ the preponderance standard because society has a minimal concern with the outcome of private suits” and because “the parties should share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.” (quotations omitted).

235 (1920) (stating that a property interest in an animal is of an “imperfect or qualified nature and [the animal] may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state”); see also, (recognizing that a child’s biological parent has a protected property interest in a contract entitling him to continued contact with his child); Falgren v. State Bd.

Moreover, we have recognized that where the Legislature does not provide a standard of proof “for statutorily-created causes of action,” this silence reflects “ ‘a signal that the legislature intended the preponderance of the evidence standard’ to apply.” (quoting State v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., ).