Cited by

(stating appellate counsel “has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims to the court”); (“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”).

Additionally, an appellate counsel “has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims to the court.” (“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”).

The Knaffla rule applies when the petitioner’s claims are “based on evidence in the trial record.”

(“counsel is under a duty to raise only meritorious claims.

.” (emphasis added)), others do not, see, n.3, 90 (Minn. 2009) (applying the exception to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim even though the same claim was rejected on direct appeal).

The petitioner must demonstrate “both that counsel’s performance was not objectively reasonable and, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Wright v. State, 7 see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690- 94 (1984).

Applied here, this standard places the burden on Zielinski to show “both that counsel’s performance was not objectively reasonable and, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Because the circumstances giving rise to the ineffective-appellate-counsel claim could not have been known by White until after his direct appeal, –91 (Minn. 2009), we will consider the merits of his ineffective-assistance argument.

“When an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is based on appellate counsel ’s failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the [petitioner] must first show that trial counsel w as ineffective to prevail on the appellate counsel claim.” Zornes, d at 371

“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.” 9 (Minn. 2009).

“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”

(stating that “[w]ith the exception of [petitioner’s] claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and his claim [related to] new evidence .

Counsel “does not act unreasonably” by declining to assert claims that she “could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”

6 “Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.” Wright v. State

“Counsel does not 6 act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”

“[W]hen an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the [petitioner] must first show that trial counsel was ineffective.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

Counsel “does not act unreasonably” by declining to assert claims that she “could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.” Wright v. State

Wright v. State , , 90 (Minn. 2009).

Appellate counsel “does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”

(quotation and citation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd.

Wright v. State , , 90 (Minn. 2009) ; White , d at 110 .

testimony, the racial remarks during closing arguments, the witness statement [appellant] wished to rebut, and the ev idence presented by the defense”); Vance v. State , (holding allegations that appellant’s “ trial counsel failed to conduct an investigation, talk to any witnesses, and call any witnesses to testify are ” Knaffla barred); cf. Wright v. State , (holding appellant’s insufficiency of evidence claim Knaffla barred); (holding that appellant’s two individual claims were barred, and dec

And trial counsel “does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”

For a claim “[t]o be reviewed in the interests of justice, a claim must have merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.”

“To be reviewed in the interests of justice, a claim must have merit and be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.”

And “[t]he petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable representation.” (quotation omitted).

( (noting that counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail)).

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant “must overcome the presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of 7 reasonable representation.” (quotation omitted).