Cited by

P. 12.03, “[w]e review de novo whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief .” d 58, 61 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

official duties, to communicate defamatory material”); –37 (Minn. 1994) (state trooper had “absolute immunity from a civil suit in defamation for the statements made in the written police report”); (“Two categories of privilege exist as defenses 11 against defamation claims—absolute privilege and conditional or ‘qualified’ privilege.

official duties, to communicate defamatory material”); –37 (Minn. 1994) (state trooper had “absolute immunity from a civil suit in defamation for the statements made in the written police report”) ; (“Two categories of privilege exist as defenses 12 against defamation claims—absolute privilege and conditional or ‘ qualified’ privilege.

14, 1995), and statements made by local governing bodies such as city councils or county boards, d 58, 63 (Minn. 2010).

But the supreme court “ha[s] consistently declined to extend absolute privilege to all legislative officers, such as those in subordinate government bodies.” Minke, d at 182; (refusing to extend absolute privilege to statements made by members of an unelected watershed district); (concluding that subordinate bodies are not protected by absolute privilege “since the members of such bodies are sufficiently protect

“[W]e consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” d 58, 61 (Minn. 2010).

See, (recognizing constitutional absolute privilege for state legislators in discharge of their official duties and caselaw extending absolute privilege to other government officials).

In determining whether a claim is legally sufficient, we consider “only the facts alleged in the complaint , accepting those facts as true and 11 drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”

The sole question on appeal is “whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” (quotation omitted).

In determining whether a claim is legally sufficient, we consider “only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”

d 850 853 (Minn. 2020); (judgments on 14 the pleadings are reviewed de novo).

(motion for judgment on the pleadings); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc. , (motion to dismiss).

We have explained that “[t] he Minnesota Constitution grants absolute privilege from defamation liability to members of the State Senate and House of Representatives i n the discharge of their official duties.” Zutz v. Nelson

(noting that an “[a]bsolute privilege is not lightly granted and applies only in limited circumstances”); see also Moreno, d at 332 (declining to adopt section 611 in full).

(dismiss); Zutz v. Nelson , (judgment on the pleadings).

Zutz v. Nelson , , 61 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Cruz-Guzman , d at 13 ; Zutz v. Nelson , , 62 (Minn. 2010).

Zutz v. Nelson , , 62 (Minn. 2010).

" Burt v. Rackner , Inc. , , 451 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Zutz v. Nelson , , 61 (Minn. 2010) ).

“[A]bsolute privile ge means that immunity is given even for intentionally false statements, coupled w ith malice, while a qualified or conditional privilege grants immunity only if the privilege is not abused and defamatory statements are publicized in good faith and without malice.” (quotation omitted).

(quoting Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc. , ).

P. 12.03, we “consider only the- facts alleged in, the complaint, accepting those facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”

WL 1752139, at * 1 (Minn. App. June 23, 2009) (Zutz I); -61 (Minn. 2010) (Zutz II); Zutz v. Nelson, No. A14 -0573, 2014 WL 7344058 , at *1-3 (Minn. App. Dec.

“[J]udgment on the pleadings is proper where the defendant relies on an affirmative defense or counterclaim which does not raise material issues of fact.” Zutz v. Nelson , (quotation omitted).

Like absolute privilege, qualified privilege is “‘based upon a policy that treats the ends to be gained by permitting defamatory statements as outweighing the harm that may be done to the reputation of others.’” -62 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 25, topic 2, tit.

Although the privilege is intended to encourage “frank testimony by witnesses,” id., it “is not lightly granted and applies only in limited circumstances,”

As a result, absolute privilege “is not lightly granted and applies only in limited circumstances.”