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(explaining that a panel erred when it “focused its inquiry on [the attorney’s] mental state and values at the time of his suspension rather than at the time of his reinstatement proceedings”).

at 247–48; (“[W]e examine a petitioner’s conduct up to the time of the reinstatement hearing and his or her mental state and values at that time.”).

(holding that the proper inquiry is not whether the petitioner has undergone a moral change before the suspension or immediately subsequent; instead, the court looks at the petitioner’s mental state and values at the time of the reinstatement hearing).

As Mose bluntly put it, “I did a very bad job, and I have remorse for it.” Mose also testified that he thinks “a lot” about the harm he caused his clients, which will lead him to “remember what [he] did wrong and try not to repeat the mistakes.” Mose’s “present candid admissions of his past misconduct weigh in favor of his reinstatement.”

See In re Dedefo , (reinstating a suspended attorney when a panel recommended against reinstatement).

Instead, we have repeatedly said that when neither party orders a transcript, the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions drawn from those facts are “conclusive.” See , Montez, d at 66; d 446, 449 (Minn. 2005).

In evaluating moral change, “we examine a petitioner’s conduct up to the time of the reinstatement hearing and his or her mental state and values at that time.” In re Dedefo

(a lawyer petitioning for reinstatement must demonstrate he has “undergone such a moral ch ange as now to render him a fit person to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited”).

" In re Dedefo , , 11 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Mose , d at 364 ).

A panel’s recommendation on reinstatement “receives no deference,” and “[w]e independently review the entire record to determine whether an attorney should be reinstated.”

Albrecht’s repeated assertions that the findings are inaccurate demonstrate the simple reason for the rule: We cannot evaluate such factual challenges without a transcript because "we cannot review the evidence supporting th[e] findings.”

-96 (Minn.2009) (ex plaining that we give deference to a referee’s factual findings especially where the referee’s findings rested on disputed testimony or an attorney’s “demeanor, credibility, or sincerity” because of the referee’s unique position to find su