Cited by

is governed by Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2024) and states that a “conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense.” “A witness is an accomplice if the witness could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the defendant is charged.” (quotation omitted).

“We will not disturb a guilty verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [a] defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).

(stating that evidence corroborating accomplice testimony “need only link the defendant to the crime in some substantial degree,” which tends “to affirm the truth” of the testimony and point to defendant’s guilt (quotation omitted)).

“[W]hat evidence to present and which witnesses to call at trial are tactical decisions properly left to the discretion of trial counsel.” (quotation omitted).

tive evidence [of the accomplice testimony] does not need to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of the defendant ’s guilt or sustain a conviction,” but rather, the corroborative evidence “need only link the defendant to the crime in some substantial degree [that] tends to affirm the truth of [the accomplice’s] testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant.” Staunton v. State , (-54 (Minn. 2008)).

Minnesota law provides that a “conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the 3 “A witness is an accomplice if the witness could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the defendant is charged.” (quotation omitted).

An accomplice’s testimony ca n be corroborated by “the defendant’s opportunity and motive to commit the crime and his proximity to the place where the crime was committed.” See Staunton v. State , (quotation omitted).

“We will not disturb a guilty verdict if the jury, act ing with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” Staunton v. State , (M inn.

(noting that “the corroborating evidence need only link the defendant to the crime in some substantial degree that tend s to affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and to point to the guilt of the defendant” (quotation omitted)).

“ T o p r e v a i l o n a n i n effective-assistance-of-counsel claim, [appellant] must prove that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective st andard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.” Staunton v. State , (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

“To prevail on an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim, [appellant] must prove that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, th e outcome would have been different.” Staunton v. State , see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

Under Strickland’s first prong, petitioner must show 5 that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (quoting Staunton v. State , d 289, 300 (Minn. 2010)) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 206 4).

State v. Williams , , 517 n.2 (Minn. 2009) (holding that although the issues in question were properly raised in the petition for review, the defendant forfeited appellate review of the issues when he failed to brief or argue the issues in our court); see also Staunton v. State , , 296 n.8 (Minn. 2010) (same); Barnes v. State , , 363 n.2 (Minn. 2009) (same); State v. Hurd , , 32 (Minn. 2009) (same); Scruggs v. State , , 24 n.1 (Minn. 1992) (same).

“[I]t is well-settled that a conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” (quoting State v. Hill , 285 Minn. 518, 518, ).

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction resulting from a jury trial, this court conducts a careful “review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favor able to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” (quotation omitted).

See, (addressing “whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Silvernail, rather than an unidentified alternative perpetrator, ca used [the victim’s] death”); Staunton v. State , -02 (Minn. 2010) (concerning “claims that counsel failed to investigate .

“In addition to di rectly committing the criminal acts, a person may be considered an accomplice if he or sh e aided and abetted the crime with which the defendant is charged.”

see also Rhodes, d at 845 (concluding that defendant failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced when his trial counsel’s representation fit squarely within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance”).

When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we conduct “ ‘a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.’” ().

This court analyzes insuffi cient-evidence arguments by determining “whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the [fact-finder] to reach its verdict.” (quotation omitted).

(noting that “[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense”).

Appellate courts “review the reasonableness of counsel’s performance based on the totality of the facts that existed at the time of counsel’s conduct.”

Staunton v. State (Staunton III)

-90 (Minn.2011); -80 (Minn.2010); -95 (Minn.2010); (discussing that an inmate refused to testify at a trial because “living in prison as a snitch was worse than the possibility of a longer sentence for refusing to testify”).

When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we conduct “a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient because it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and, second, that the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance because “a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.” (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 , 104 S.Ct.

When assessing whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we conduct “a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).