Cited by

See, (concurrent 189- month sentences for five counts of first-degree assault against a peace officer); WL 313077, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan.

Although it is true, as Pohl points out, that when a statutory phrase is undefined, a court 10 generally may “turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of [the] statutory phrase,” this principle does not state or imply anything about what a district court must provide to a jury when a term is defined.

When “construing statutes, we assume that the Legislature enacts statutes ‘with full knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject.’ ” (quoting Meister v. W. Nat.

“When a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is appropriate to turn to the canons of statutory construction to ascertain a statute’s meaning.” State v. Leathers , d 606, 611 (Minn. 2011).

(“ In the absence of a statutory definition , we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.” (emphasis added)).

Rickmyer argues the district court erre d in concluding that Woodall’s alleged conduct did not constitute “repeated incidents.” The HRO statute does not define “repeated incidents.” If a word or phrase of a statute is undefined, appellate courts “generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.”

“ In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.”

(quoting State v. Leathers , , 611 (Minn. 2011) ); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (setting forth the canons of statutory construction).

They cite to State v. Leathers , in support of their position.

at 436 ; see also State v. Eason , , 842 (Minn. 2018) ; Nelson , d at 436 ; State v. Leathers , , 608-09 (Minn. 2011) ; Occhino v. Grover , , 359-60 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 28, 2002).

If the language of a statute is unamb iguous, we “[do] not e ngage in any further construction and instead look[] to the plai n meaning of the stat utory language.” (c itation omitted).

Appellate courts “assume that the Legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject.” (quotation omitted).

“Interpreting a sentencing statute is a question of law, which we review *351 de novo.” ().

C. Finally, in which we interpreted the phrase “full term 9 of imprisonment” in Minnesota Statutes § 609.221, subd.

“In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.”

“In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a 4 statutory phrase.”