Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606.

117 citing documents.

In the Marriage of: Sarah Lynn Nelson, n/k/a Sarah Lynn Derry v. Abel Aaron Nelson, Ramsey County, Intervenor Minn. Ct. App. 2026
“In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory [word or] phrase.”
Ryan Timothy Kellen v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2026
See, (concurrent 189- month sentences for five counts of first-degree assault against a peace officer); WL 313077, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan.
State of Minnesota v. Miguel Angel Rodriguez Minn. Ct. App. 2026
State of Minnesota v. Jarrod James Pohl Minn. Ct. App. 2025
Although it is true, as Pohl points out, that when a statutory phrase is undefined, a court 10 generally may “turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of [the] statutory phrase,” this principle does not state or imply anything about what a district court must provide to a jury when a term is defined.
State of Minnesota v. John Ishmael Bradley, III Minn. 2024
State of Minnesota v. John Ishmael Bradley, III Minn. 2024
When “construing statutes, we assume that the Legislature enacts statutes ‘with full knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject.’ ” (quoting Meister v. W. Nat.
City of Hutchinson v. Mohammed Shahidullah, AKA Sam Ulland, RE: The Hazardous Building located at 430 Waters St. … Minn. Ct. App. 2021
“When a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is appropriate to turn to the canons of statutory construction to ascertain a statute’s meaning.” State v. Leathers , d 606, 611 (Minn. 2011).
Jessica Hagen, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Minn. 2021
(“ In the absence of a statutory definition , we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.” (emphasis added)).
Peter Richard Rickmyer v. Mimmie Woodall Minn. Ct. App. 2021
Rickmyer argues the district court erre d in concluding that Woodall’s alleged conduct did not constitute “repeated incidents.” The HRO statute does not define “repeated incidents.” If a word or phrase of a statute is undefined, appellate courts “generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.”
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. F., Parent Minn. Ct. App. 2020
State of Minnesota v. Melody Victoria Gray Minn. Ct. App. 2020
Jenna Marie Bjerke v. Dan Naweto Flomo Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“ In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.”
Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson 929 N.W.2d 398 Minn. 2019
Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson 929 N.W.2d 398 Minn. 2019
(quoting State v. Leathers , , 611 (Minn. 2011) ); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (setting forth the canons of statutory construction).
State of Minnesota v. Jesse Richard McGinnis Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota v. Leon Travis Franklin Minn. Ct. App. 2019
They cite to State v. Leathers , in support of their position.
State v. Wood 922 N.W.2d 209 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State v. Wood 922 N.W.2d 209 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
at 436 ; see also State v. Eason , , 842 (Minn. 2018) ; Nelson , d at 436 ; State v. Leathers , , 608-09 (Minn. 2011) ; Occhino v. Grover , , 359-60 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 28, 2002).
State of Minnesota v. David Robert Davidson Minn. Ct. App. 2018
Russell Eldon Briles, Minn. 2018
Minn. 2018
State of Minnesota v. Marcus Tavon Brown Minn. Ct. App. 2017
If the language of a statute is unamb iguous, we “[do] not e ngage in any further construction and instead look[] to the plai n meaning of the stat utory language.” (c itation omitted).
State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy 903 N.W.2d 633 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State ex rel. Huseby v. Roy 903 N.W.2d 633 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Back v. State 902 N.W.2d 23 Minn. 2017
Back v. State 902 N.W.2d 23 Minn. 2017
State v. Thonesavanh 904 N.W.2d 432 Minn. 2017
State v. Thonesavanh 904 N.W.2d 432 Minn. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Dion Lavell Abrams Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Phone Recovery Services, LLC v. Qwest Corp. 901 N.W.2d 185 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Phone Recovery Services, LLC v. Qwest Corp. 901 N.W.2d 185 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Appellate courts “assume that the Legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject.” (quotation omitted).
State v. Smith 899 N.W.2d 120 Minn. 2017
Michael Robert Robinson v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Michael Vincent Leith Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Michael Gene Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State v. Boecker 893 N.W.2d 348 Minn. 2017
State v. Boecker 893 N.W.2d 348 Minn. 2017
“Interpreting a sentencing statute is a question of law, which we review *351 de novo.” ().
State of Minnesota v. Scotty Nicolas Perez Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Eugene Lee Rushton v. State of Minnesota 889 N.W.2d 561 Minn. 2017
Eugene Lee Rushton v. State of Minnesota 889 N.W.2d 561 Minn. 2017
C. Finally, in which we interpreted the phrase “full term 9 of imprisonment” in Minnesota Statutes § 609.221, subd.
TCI Business Capital, Inc. v. Five Star American Die Casting, LLC, Brian T. Flynn 890 N.W.2d 423 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
TCI Business Capital, Inc. v. Five Star American Die Casting, LLC, Brian T. Flynn 890 N.W.2d 423 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
“In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.”
State of Minnesota v. Alie Christine Theodore Dorn 887 N.W.2d 826 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Alie Christine Theodore Dorn 887 N.W.2d 826 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. David Lee Haywood 886 N.W.2d 485 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. David Lee Haywood 886 N.W.2d 485 Minn. 2016
“In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary meaning of a 4 statutory phrase.”
State of Minnesota v. August Latimothy Fleming 883 N.W.2d 790 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. August Latimothy Fleming 883 N.W.2d 790 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Forrest Grant Noggle 881 N.W.2d 545 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Forrest Grant Noggle 881 N.W.2d 545 Minn. 2016