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In our view, Congress signaled an intention to limit the coverage by specifying an act “requisite to voting” 21 instead of using “to vote.” (reasoning that Congress, by using one term in one part of a statute and another set of terms in a related statutory provision, “dr[ew] an express distinction between” the terms); Salinas v. United States R.R.

And a statute’s silence “does not render a statute ambiguous unless the silence renders the statute susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” ().

-49 (Minn. 2011); In re Welfare of Child.

Underlying ICWA are concerns of “abusive child welfare practices that resu lted in the separation of 8 large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.” (quotation omitted); see also 25 U.S.C.

(alteration in original) (quotation omitted); see also 25 U.S.C.

When a statute “is clearly limited to specifically enumerated subjects, we do not extend its application to other subjects by process of construction.”

When a statute “is clearly limited to specifically enumerated subjects, we do not extend its application to other subjects by process of construction.”

We have recognized that “silence does not render a statute ambiguous unless the silence renders the statute susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.” (quotation omitted).