Cited by

(stating that we cannot add words to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted).

-15 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

see also 4 Mother uses “authority” to refer to what Minnesota Statutes section 260C.101, subdivisions 1 and 2 call the juvenile court’s “original and exclusive jurisdiction.” Because the governing statute refers to the juvenile court’s “original and exclusive jurisdiction,” we refer to the juven

21 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); (defining and applying the associated words canon, which provides that “a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, -35 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted); (“We will not set aside a district court’s factual findings underlying an award of attorney fees unless they are clearly erroneous.” (quotation omitted)).

MnDOT argues an award of “reasonable attorney fees” cannot exceed the amount owed to the landowner’s attorney in a contingent fee agreement, while Hamlin claims an award of “reasonable 2 attorney fees” in an eminent domain dispute is any amount calculated by the lodestar method we applied to section 117.031(a) d 700, 711 (Minn. 2013).

see also Great River Energy, d at 364 (stating that we cannot add words to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted).

(stating that courts “do not add words or phrases to an unambiguous statute”).

(“[I]f a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, ‘then we must apply the statute’s plain meaning.’ ” (citation omitted)).

(holding that “‘[t]here is no precise rule or formula ’ for applying the results-obtained factor, and a district c ourt may either ‘attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated’ or ‘simply reduce the award to account for the limited success’ ” (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S

(stating that courts cannot “add words or phrases to an unambiguous statute”).

“[I]f a statute i s susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, then we must apply the statute ’s plain meaning.” (quotation omitted).

d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013).

(recognizing that the word “just” in the Fifth Amendment “evokes ideas of fairness and equity” (quotations omitted)), aff’d

County of Dakota v. Cameron , (courts cannot “add words or phrases to an unambiguous statute .”).

See, e.g. , (determining that the phrase “comparable property” has a technical meaning absent a statutory definition of the phrase); 8 The state cites only one dictionary definition in support of its assertion.

(“[W]e do not add words or phrases to an unambiguous statute.”).

“We will not set aside a district court’s factual findings underlying an award of attorney fees unless they are clearly erroneous.” (quotation omitted).

The Bhaktas rely on the following language from this court’s opinion in County of Dakota v. Cameron: “We discern no reason not to rely on traditionally utilized market - value approaches when d etermining damages under the minimum -compensation statute.” aff’d

of Dakota v. Cameron , , 711 (Minn. 2013).

Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC

An appellate court “will not set aside a district court’s factual findings underlying an award of attorney fees unless they are clearly erroneous.” (quotation omitted).

Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, “a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” County of Dakota v. Cameron , (quotation omitted).

County of Dakota v. Cameron

(“[W]e do not add words ...

And an appellate court “will not set aside a district court’s factual findings underlying an award of attorney fees unless they are clearly erroneous.” (quotation omitted).

If a statute is ambiguous, we apply “the canons of statutory construction to determine its meaning.” County of Dakota v. Cameron