Cited by

For a full recitation of the facts underlying the offense, -32 (Minn. 2013) (Castillo-Alvarez II).

the district court’s failure to ‘explain’ [the aggravating] factor did not preclude the court from using it as a reason for departure.” aff’d sub nom.

(acknowledging that double jeopardy is affirmative defense and considering whether appellant waived double-jeopardy claim by entering second guilty plea); State v. Fredlund, 273 N.W.

Although Rekieta suggests we should employ the “most- significant-relationship” test, 2 the parties ultimately agree—as do we—that the five-factor 2 n.6 (Minn. 2013), Rekieta contends that “Minnesota recognizes and uses the Restatement’s most-significant-relationship approach to resolve a variety of choice-of-law issues.” See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law § 150 (1971).

to decide the issue under the Minnesota Constitution, but also recognized that the constitutional interests in avoiding self-incrimination and coerced confessions would be served by a prophylactic rule that both “creat[es] an accurate record of a defendant’s interrogation for trial and appeal” and “discourag[es] unfair and psychologically coercive police tactics.” (quotation omitted) (explaining the reasons for the rule established in Scales).

But “it is well settled that advising a client not to testify does not render trial counsel incompetent.” aff’d

“The interpretation and application of the Minnesota Constitution is a legal question that we review de novo.”

aff’d, (upholding upward departure on three-or- more-participants factor).

“Whether a stated reason for departure is proper is a legal determination that we review de novo.” 2 State v. Alvarez , aff’d

at 651-52; d 601, 624 (Minn. App. 2012) (stating that severe aggravating factors were not required to impose an upward durational departure and consecutive sentence because imposing a consecutive sentence “was not a departure under the guidelines”), aff’d

d 601, 623 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d on other grounds

As we have stated, “[p]rivileges are not like other rules of evidence and hold a unique place in the law,” because they have a “substantive component.” ( “like the privilege at issue in Heaney[,] .

(affirming district court’s ruling on hearsay exception based on implied findings), aff’d

has previously stated that “[n]o Minnesota caselaw directly requires the district court to state in writing or on the record its finding that the requisite showings have been made under rule 801(d)(2)(E).” (noting that the rules of evidence and caselaw state in other contexts when explicit findings are required), aff’d on other grounds

See, -36 (Minn.2013) (adopting the dual-sovereignty doctrine for double-jeopardy challenges under the Minnesota Constitution); -88 (Minn.1996) (following the Supreme Court’s lead in replacing the double-jeopardy test from Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 , 100 S.Ct.

(reviewing constitutional question de novo); Mar *429 tin ex rel.