Cited by

(declining to address appellant’s claims because he “fail[ed] to cite any evidence in the record or legal authority to support” them).

Accordingly, an appellate court’s “review of the district court’s determination of juror impartiality is especially deferential.” d 1, 6-7 (Minn. 2024) (“The reason [appellate courts] give deference [on questions of juror impartiality] is that a district court is best positioned to judge a juror’s demeanor, as opposed to an appellate court’s review of a cold record.”).

Once a public defender has been appointed to represent an indigent defendant, “ a district court must grant a defendant’s request for substitute appointed counsel ‘only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.’” d 221, 235 (Minn. 2026) ().

13 Rather, a district court must grant a defendant’s request for substitute appointed counsel “only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.” 4 (quoting Worthy, d at 278).

Additionally, “a defendant’s general dissatisfaction with appointed counsel does not amount to an exceptional circumstance.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, an appellate court’s “review of the district court’s determination of juror impartiality is especially deferential.” d 1, 6- 7 (Minn. 2024) (stating that “[t]he reason [appellate courts] give deference [on questions of juror impartiality] is that a district court is best positioned to judge a juror’s demeanor, as opposed to an appellate court’s review of a cold record”).

(explaining that a person’s “demeanor plays a fundamental role” in determining “credibility”).

d 569, 587 (Minn. 2013).

“[T]he right of an indigent defendant to court -appointed defense counsel is not an unbridled right to be represented by counsel of [the defendant’s] choosing.” (quotation omitted).

“We review the district court’s denial of a challenge for cause for an abuse of discretion.”

(emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).

In evaluating alleged misconduct during a closing argument, appellate courts consider “the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” d 569, 587 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

1 See State v. Munt (Munt I), Munt v. State (Munt II), Munt v. State (Munt III), Munt v. State (Munt IV)

When evaluating alleged misconduct during a closing argument, 20 appellate courts consider “the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

“But the defendant must still comply with established rules of evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in assessing guilt or innocence.” (quotation omitted).

(emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).

When evaluating alleged prosecutorial misconduct, a reviewing court “look[s] to the closing argument as a whole,” d 1, 18 (Minn. 2024) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted), and it does not give “undue prominence” to selected phrases or remarks, d 142, 162-63 (Minn. 2024) (citing cases that decline to grant a new trial based on isolated instances of misconduct).

A defendant is entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel “only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made .” ().

See, (noting which of the pro se appellant’s claims lacked support and declining to address them further).

12 that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence .” (quotation omitted).

VI; Minn. Const. art I, § 6; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)

The challenging party bears the burden to show that a “juror expressed a state of mind demonstrating actual bias towards the case or either party.” (quotation omitted).

A prosecutor “may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence in its closing argument.” d 569, 587 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

He buttresses the argument by quoting lines from cases that refer to the district court’s competency testing also using a plural term , such as “whether the child has the ability to relate events truthfully,” (emphasis added), and whether he or she “could adequately relate facts regarding events,” (emphasis added), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

A district court may remove a juror if the juror “expresse[s] a ‘state of mind’ demonstrating ‘actual bias’ towards the case or either party.” ( n.2 (Minn. 2007)).

A prosecutor “may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences 12 that can be drawn from that evidence in its closing argument,” d 569, 587 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted), but engages in misconduct by misstating the law, misstating the facts, or misleading the jury about the inferences it may draw from the facts

“We review the district court’s denial of a challenge for cause for an abuse of discretion,” and “[o]ur review of the district court’s determination of juror impartiality is especially deferential.”

“A criminal defendant’s right to present a complete defense includes the right to call and examine witnesses.”

A defendant has a right to “call and examine witnesses.” d 569, 585 (Minn. 2013).

The prosecution “may present ‘all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence’ in its closing argument.” ().

“Impartiality requires absence of ‘actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.’” ().

Although we generally review a denial of a for-cause challenge of a juror for an abuse of discretion, because Miller neither objected to the juror nor moved to strike the juror for cause at trial, we review this issue for plain error.