Cited by

Although we generally review a denial of a for-cause challenge of a juror for an abuse of discretion, because Miller neither objected to the juror nor moved to strike the juror for cause at trial, we review this issue for plain error.

If we determine that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence, “and that error deprived the defendant of a constitutional right, we then review whether that exclusion of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The party challenging a juror “has the burden of proving that the juror expressed a state of mind demonstrating actual bias towards the case or either party.” (quotations omitted).

We must presume that the district court “discharged [its] judicial duties properly.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

If a party challenges a prospective juror on this basis—for actual bias—the party “must show that the juror exhibited strong and deep impressions that would prevent her from laying aside her impression or opinion and rendering a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” (quotations omitted).

(explaining that prosecutor may present all legitimate arguments and inferences based on the evidence).

“[T]he State may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence in its closing argument.” (quotation omitted).

“The defendant has the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts.” d 569, 583 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6

“When reviewing a claim that a judge was partial against the defendant, we presume the judge discharged his or her judicial duties properly.” State v. Munt , (quotation omitted).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that a searching inquiry is required only when the defendant raises serious compla ints about the effec tiveness of appointed counsel’s representation).

“Personal tension” between attorney and client does not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting substitute counsel, see State v. Voorhees , nor does general dissatisfacti on with counsel’s “assessment of the case,” Worthy, d at 279; -87 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that statement that counsel “didn’ t represent [his] interest” did not establish exceptional circumstances warranting furt her inquiry).

“Put differently, the challenging party has the burden of proving that the juror expressed a state of mind demonstrating actual bias towards th e case or either party.” State v. Munt , (quotation s omitted).

Impartiality requires the absence of “actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particul ar case.” (quot ation omitted).

“When the defendant voices serious allegations of inadequate representation, the district c ourt should conduct a s earching inquiry before determining whether the defendant’s complain ts warrant the appointment of substitute counsel.” State v. Munt , 6 (Minn. 2013) (quo tation omitted).

The state “may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence in its closing argument.”

When reviewing a claim of judicial bias we presume that a judge “discharged his or her judicial duties properly.” State v. Munt , d 569, 580 (Minn. 2013).

When reviewing a claim that a judge was partial against a party, we presume the judge “discharged his or her judicial duties properly.” ().

“When a defendant raises complaints about the effectiveness of appointed counsel’s representation and requests substitute counsel, the district court must grant su ch a request only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.” State v. Munt , (quotation omitted).

When a defendant articulates concerns about his court-appointed attorneys’ performance and requests substitute counsel, the district court must grant the request “‘only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.’” ().

For a judge to be impartial, she must possess “no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” (quoting McKenzie v. State , ).

Impartiality req uires absence of “ ‘actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular 9 case.’ ” State v. Munt , (quoting McKenzie v. State , ).

A prosecutor may “present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.” (quotation omitted).

(quoting Clark, d at 464).

Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 339 -45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 794-97 (1963)

If the defendant “voices serious allegations of inadequate representation, the district court should conduct a searching inquiry before determining whether the defe ndant’s complaints warrant the appointment of substitute counsel.” State v. Munt , (quotation omitted).

ce, the abuse of discr etion has to be shown on a record that is fairly limited in scope: “an offer of proof provides the [district] court with an opportunity to ascertain the admissibility of the proffered evidence and provides a record for a reviewing court to determine whether the lower court ruli ng was correct.” (“When the district court excludes evidence, an of fer of proof provides the evidentiary basis for the court’s decision.”).

State v. Munt , , 587 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

State v. Munt , , 587 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

State v. Munt , (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).

During closing argument, a prosecutor may “present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.” (quotation omitted).