Cited by

are construed according to [their] special meaning.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by, Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (“[T]echnical words and phrases .

In addition, the canon of word association directs that “when context suggests that a group of words have something in common, each word should be ascribed a meaning that is consistent with its accompanying words.” –42 (Minn. 2017).

–85 (Minn. 2013), we applied the associated words canon to determine that a statute was ambiguous.

See State v. Rick , d 478, 484 (Minn. 2013), d 432, 440–41 (Minn. 2017).

See, abrogated on other grounds, ; Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020) (“[T]echnical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning .

statute and amend it accordingly.” State v. Rick

“Whether to ascribe ‘a technical or special meaning [to a word or phrase] depends in part upon the context in whic h the word appears.’” Bowen, d at 766 ().

“If ‘the legislature’s intent is clear from plain and unambiguous statutory language,’ we look to the plain meaning of the statute without engaging in further statutory construction.” ( aff’d, ), review denied (Minn. Aug.

State v. Rick , , 484 (Minn. 2013).

State v. Rick , , 613-14 (Minn. App. 2012), aff'd

State v. Struzyk , , 284-85 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Rick , , 482 (Minn. 2013) ).

In State v. Rick , the supreme court determined that section 609.2241, subdivision 2(2), was ambiguous because the common and ordinary meaning of the word "transfer" was different from the specialized, technical meaning of the word.

(citing State v. Rick , , 484 (Minn. 2013) ).

(rejecting an “interpretation [that] would render the statute redundant and ...

2020 (applying the rule of lenity ahead of other extrinsic aids of statutory construction, stating that “[t]he rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subject to them”); (turning first to the rule of lenity to adopt the narrower of two interpretations).

d 478, 485 (Minn. 2013).

Id.; (declining to apply a statutory definition where its application would violate the canon against surplusage and the rules of grammar).

We have held that “when context suggests that a group of words have something in common, each word should be ascribed a meaning that is consistent with its accompanying words.” (applying the associated-words canon to interpret the statutory term “transfer” in light of the characteristics of the substances listed in the statute); see also Wong v. Am.

“If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.”

In the absence of an applicable statutory definition, “we generally give statutory terms their common meaning.”