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Building on that statutory description, Abikar argues that the state supreme court’s decision in State v. Dorn exculpates her because, there, the supreme court determined that the assault- harm provision requires that a defendant 6 “intentionally apply force to another person without his consent.”

When determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appellate review, this court must “view the evidence i n the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” (quotation omitted).

“General intent is satisfied when a defendant ‘intentionally engag[ed] in the prohibited conduct.’” 4 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Fleck, d at 308).

Pope maintains that, “inflict” means something more direct than “cause,” and, therefore, his conviction must be reversed because the evidence does not support a finding that Pope directly caused J.O.’s injuries.

(citing Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.

We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” (quotation omitted).

(noting that, as an error-correcting court, this court lacks authority to change established supreme court precedent), aff'd, ("This is an error-correcting court, and we apply the best law available to us."), aff'd, ("[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the

(clarifying that assault-harm is voluntary offense that requires only general intent to commit the physical act that is forbidden under Minnesota law).

We “will not disturb the verdict if the factfinder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Dorn