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For a general-intent crime, the state must prove that Conkling “intended to do the physical act forbidden” but need not prove that “she meant to or knew that she would violate the law or cause a particular result.” (quotations omitted).

This means that, although the state must prove that McDowell “intended to do the physical act forbidden,” the state 5 does not need to prove that “[he] meant to or knew that [he] would violate the law or cause a particular result.”

Rather, “the mens rea element of assault-harm, ‘intentional,’ requires only the general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.” (citing Fleck, d at 309).

10(2); (explaining that “[i]n Minnesota, the separate crime of battery has been incorporated into the definition of assault”).

“[A] general-intent crime only requires proof that the defendant intended to do the physical act forbidden, without proof that [he] meant to or knew that [he] would violate the law or cause a particular result.” (quotations omitted).

d 826, 830 (Minn. 2016).

9 an assault case, the supreme court stated that the word “inflict” means “to lay (a blow) on” or “cause (something damaging or painful) to be endured.” Id.

Robinson, d at 761; (concluding this standard applies to both court and jury trials).

When interpreting statutes, this court seeks to “effectuate the intention of the legislature.” (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022).

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in a light most favorable to the conviction and will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.”

d 303, 312 (Minn. 2012).

In State v. Dorn, the supreme court considered whether “ Fleck erroneously established a strict -liability standard for even friendly consensual touching.”

Graf contends that this statement suggested the state did not need to prove Graf’s general intent “to do the prohibited physical act of committing a battery.” (quotation omitted).

As the supreme court explained in a more recent decision, State v. Dorn, assault- harm requires “only an intent to do the prohibited physical act of committing a battery.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); compare Fleck, d at 309 (explaining that domestic assault bodily harm is a general-intent crime because it prohibits the intentional infliction of bodily harm), -54 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that the crime of f

–31 (Minn. 2016); –10 (Minn. 2012).

“[T]he mens rea element of assault-harm, ‘intentional,’ requires only the general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.” State v. Dorn , (citing State v. Fleck , (holding that assault-harm is a general-intent crime)).

An error in jury instructions is not 4 (“‘Inflict’ means ‘to lay (a blow) on’ or ‘cause (something damaging or painful) to be endured.’”) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1160 (2002)).

(stating that application of law requires evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence).

1 Korolchuk, in claiming the district co urt erred in its instructions, cites State v. Dorn, in which our supreme court held that the mens rea requirement for assault -harm “requires only that general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.”

See, (“The application of the law to Dorn’s conduct requires an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence.”).

The state must prove that a defendant “intentionally appl[ied] force to another person without [] consent.”

Put differently, “the defendant need only intend to commit an act that constitutes a battery.” d 826, 831 (Minn. 2016).

“We review questions of law de novo.”

This is a general intent crime, requiring “only the general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.” State v. Dorn

See State v. Dorn , (stating that appellate cour ts review questions of law de novo).

hen considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in a light most favorable to the conviction and will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.”

“General intent is satisfied when a defendant intentionally engaged in the prohibited conduct.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he mens rea element of assault -harm, ‘intentional,’ requires only the general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.” State v. Dorn , ( (holding that assault-harm is general-intent crime)).

Building on that statutory description, Abikar argues that the state supreme court’s decision in State v. Dorn exculpates her because, there, the supreme court determined that the assault- harm provision requires that a defendant 6 “intentionally apply force to another person without his consent.”